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"Tree of Jesse" sequence for 197 8 Advent-Christmas Service
of Vespers folder by Jim Lyles.

The Cresset

Ricochet Romance
Americans tend to swing back and forth between their
romance with the City and their romance with the
Country, and much of our common culture thus lunges
and lurches between City and Country like a young
lover between passionate affairs with very diflerent
ladies.
For a time Americans may pursue their romance with
the City, as in the 60s, and the celebrated qualities of our
common culture become vigor, urbanity, seculan·ty,
rationality, power, the pleasures of polymorphous sex,
and the heroic strain of social progress. The icons of the
60s were appropriately JFK, James Bond as 007, acid
rock, swinging singles, fists clenched in liberation, napalm, moonshots, and Petula Clark sing£ng "Downtown. " But eventually the romance with the City chills
and finally palls. The City of our romance is a nice
place to visit but you wouldn't want to live there.
Then Americans may pursue their romance w£th the
Country, as in the 70s, and the celebrated qualities of our
common culture become southern rusticity, born-again
religiousness, introspection, political nativism, and a
movement back to the basics of nature, the family, and
the home. The icons of the 70s were appropriately
Jimmy Carter, country music on the Top Ten, Jerry
Falwell on "The Old Time Gospel Hour," the Waltons,
urban cowboys, granola, languid hot tubs for the lat"d
back, and John Denver singing "Country Roads." But
tht"s romance will also ft"nally cloy and soporify.
Meanwhile, beneath both romances the real dn·vi"ng
force of modern America-technocratic hedonism-is
push£ng Amen·ca beyond any genuine posst"bt"lities for
true city or country life. Perhaps that new way of life
which /£es beyond both traditional civil£ty and gentility
is now seen most clearly emerging in the American Sunbelt, but many of us can see it coming in our corners of
America as well. The barbarians or rubes are not at the
gates of our cities nor are the decadent or citified overrunning our countryside; rather the earnest developers
with no end in sight except "more" are at all our doorsteps.
Leading us into his own biographical experience to
illuminate this development is our December alumni
columnist, Ronald W Raschke. A Chn·st College scholar
with an interdisciplinary major in the humanities, he
was graduated from the University in 1970. That year
he began his ministerial studies at Concordia Seminary,
St. Louis, and he completed them in exile at Christ
Seminary-Seminex in 1974.
Pastor Raschke is married to Marcia Thaemert ( VU
1970) and they live on the plains of eastern Kansas where
he serves two parishes near Kansas City.
The Cresset welcomes alumnus Roschke to In Luce
Tua.
The Editor

December, 1980

Confessions
Of an Urban
Chauvinist
Ronald W. Raschke
I was an urban chauvinist. I confess it without pride.
I now bare my soul that others whose lives are crippled
by this prejudice may be led to curb their rabid urban
impulses.
I was not always an urban chauvinist. Once I was a
suburban chauvinist. I came by it naturally, having
grown up just outside Chicago. That is not an excuse; it
is a biographical fact. But the details of our stories shape
our lives. Some males grow into male chauvinists; some
suburbanites become suburban chauvinists.
I was never a gung-ho defender of suburbia. (Is anyone?) I preferred the electricity of the Loop. True, the
city was dirtier, hotter in summer, colder when a winter
wind could sharpen itself along Lake Michigan' shore.
That is why there are suburbs. During those early chauvinistic years, what lay between my suburban home and
that downtown nucleus of Western urban civilization
was of little importance to me. It wa the blur of gray
neighborhoods flowing over the window of my Chicago
and North Western train like dirty rain. The were th
miles of wasteland over which I pas ed on that ribbon
of expressway that connected me to The City. Oh, I had
the chauvinism bad!
Then, when I was nineteen, I tumbled into th
rban
Studies program at Valparai o ni er ity. I w nt back
into neighborhood I had pa d over and di overed
that flesh and blood people lived there. Many of them
were black. I had alway recognized th pr n e of
blacks in Chicago and wa aware of the diff r nt lif
style and language which eparated their world from
mine. What I had not realized wa that thi black world
had an integrity and logic of its own. It made
if viewed from the in ide out, was ju t as r
world in which I lived. nd th i ue r all wa r ality.
I had never really
nor re p ct d th r alit of tho
neighborhood . Throughout th
rban tudi
program I kept aying to my If ov r and o r "All thi
wa going on in thi cit and I n
r kn . I pa d
over and through a whole orld with ut
3

We look so long through the light of our own experience that whenever we turn our gaze
into the darkness of the unfamiliar, all we see is the negative after-image which has
been burned on our retinas. We see what we think we see. Nothing more, nothing less.

But isn't that always a dimension of chauvinism? We
look so long through the window of our experience that
whenever we turn our gaze into the darkness of the unfamiliar, all we see is the negative after-image which
has been burned on our retinas. We live by presupposition rather than perception. We see what we think we
see. Nothing more, nothing less. Except every so often
we encounter the miracle, the anomaly, the perceptual
and intellectual tremor as the tectonic plates in our
heads shift and make room for new ideas, new worlds.
That is what had happened to me when I was nineteen.
So I ceased to be a suburban chauvinist. Purged by the
political fires of the city, the antiwar movement and the
greening of America, I faced the final third of the twentieth century as part of a bold new breed of Americans,
heirs of the pilgrim spirit, freed from servitude to old
political, racist, and sexist stereotypes to dream and
create a new society of equals. So I thought.
The four years after college were another era of shifting intellectual and perceptual landscapes, but these
occurred less cataclysmically than my urban revolution.
I was at the seminary in St. Louis, studying first to be a
theologian, but later redirecting my preparation toward the parish ministry. The shift was subtle but sig-

THECRESSET
The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset was pleased to publish the position
papers of Theodore Jungk un tz and Walter E. Keller
on "The Question of the Ordination of Women" in
its regular pages.
In response to reader interest, the Cresset is further
pleased to announce that reprints of both position
papers in one eight-page folio are now available for
congregational and pastoral conference study .
Please accompany reprint orders with a check
payable to the Cresset and mail to:
The Creaset
Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indiana 46383
Single Copy, 25C
10 Copies for 20C E11eh
100 Cop;.• for 15C Each
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nificant, a sign of the socializing process which is seminary education. For whatever else a seminary does, it
does socialize. It must. Pastoral ministry is more than
an intellectual discipline, more than a profession. It is
an identity, a conscious structuring of the geography of
mind, spirit, and personality to make a shepherd in the
image of the Shepherd. That that task even partially
succeeds in anyone is a sign of the Spirit.
The four years in which I was being seminaried were
unique. The year of my graduation and first call was
1974-the year of The Purge in the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod. I was a purgee, but that is another
story. It fits into this story only in so far as it was a factor
in determining where I would be sent to minister-to
two small rural parishes in eastern Kansas. These were
not places which I would have chosen, but those early
months of placement at Seminex were times in which
any opportunity to minister was a gift. I felt the urge of
the Spirit in the push of the call. This is where he was
sending me. I went.
Whatever landscaping had been accomplished at the
seminary, it had left my basic perceptual outlook on
society intact. As I left for that ministry on the Great
Plains, I felt that my awakened urban consciousness
from the 60s helped forewarn me of what I might be
facing. It could be difficult and discouraging. I was
going into the heart of Middle America, ministering to
good-hearted Christians who, nevertheless, might not
entirely appreciate the more liberated concepts of equality, who might not understand the plight of the urban
poor or Third World, who might be more inclined to
pursue military might than detente, who might be skeptical of strangers and anyone unlike them. That image
of rural folk is clear and familiar; it is a nationally shared
conviction. At least I knew what to expect, and so, as a
good pastor, I could work patiently with these people to
expand their world and their humanity.
Sure enough, when I got to Kansas my presuppositions were backed up by my perceptions. I was out in the
middle of nowhere with nothing but miles of corn as far
as the eye could see. (Oh, some of it was soybeans, but
when you've seen one crop, I thought, you've seen them
all.)
My first pastoral call in Kansas was made on a family
five miles out of town. Forty seconds after alighting
from my Volkswagen I was greeted by a mad farm dog
that kept attacking my leg and soon had me trapped on
the family's doorstep. The dog knew I was urban; it
could smell the city on my shoes. The family did not
c?me to my rescue; I'm not sure why. I thought of the
time I had been attacked by a dog in a Gary, Indiana
ghetto. There I went next door for help, even if I was a
honky ; but where do you go for help when you are trapThe Cresset

In spite of what city-dwellers, ec clesiastical bureaucrats, or naive seminary graduates
might believe, the countr yside and its people are not ..undeveloped territory" waiting
for someone to urbanize t hem s o that they may discover their true meaning and destiny.

ped on your parishioner's threshold and their nearest
neighbor is half a mile away? What does "neighbor"
even mean out here? I imagined these might be my life's
final thoughts.
I survived. Later during that first year I got to know
a woman who, like most of my members, had belonged
to that congregation her whole life, and who was even
living in the very house in which she had been born
over seventy years before. Amazing!
"Have you traveled much? Seen much of the country?"
I asked during a pastoral visit. (She did not have a dog.)
"No, not that much to see," she answered.
"Oh, I don't know," I replied in my best pastoral patience. "Kansas City seems pretty interesting to me."
"Nope. Never been to Kansas City."
"Never?!" I was trying hard to mask my incredulity.
Kansas City was only fifty miles away.
"No. Been to St. Joe once, but you see one city, you've
seen them all."
Aha! There it was in crystallized form-the source of
so much of my early frustration in this call: the isolation, the myopia. I began to realize why it felt as if I had
entered an alien world. This place was a living fossil
of the way the world must have been fifty, perhaps a
hundred years ago. In my best pastoral form I knew that
more than pity was required; I must also cherish and
protect this nearly extinct variety of life which would
soon disappear from this country and one day, perhaps,
from the face of this planet. Forever. One way or another, though, these people would change. Sooner or
later they would have to face The Inevitable.
You see, I was still blind to my own chauvinism. One
reason why is that it continued to be so reinforced by so
many people. Most of them were Urban.
"My gosh, you really are out in the middle of nowhere!" they would say during the course of their first
visit to our home.
"Yeah," I replied in my best I-told-you-so. "But someday all this will change. You know, they're building
I-435 just five miles east of here and then this whole
area will be developed. I just wonder how this area will
go. I mean, being right on the highway, it could go industrial or commercial, but then again it might go residential."
The unspoken presupposition behind all the possibilities was that the future belonged to the city. And with
that superhighway would come more people, and the
people would mean a bigger congregation - more bodies
and more bucks- and that spelled success. At the seminary we always learned that spiritual success could not
be measured in bodies and bucks, but it is hard to find a
place in the church that sooner or later doesn't get
sucked into the equation.
December, 1980

For example, the ecclesiastical bureaucracy some
years back decided to start a new Lutheran church just
six miles south of one of my congregations. Why? Because a projection of population trends indicated that
the city would grow in that direction, not our's. Where
the city is, there are the people, and that is where the
church must be. Irrefutable logic. Planning. Stewardship.
The city never grew in that direction. Some of my
parishioners snicker at the thought. "Planning!" But
that is simply a freak accident, isn't it. I mean, you cannot decide to not plan simply because plans do not always materialize the way they are supposed to. No, it is
still more logical, more reasonable, more scientific,
more responsible to plan what you will do rather than
to simply do what you have always done. I was convinced
of it.
My first appreciation of the rural ethos came in terms
of dollars and cents. I soon learned that farming is big
business that takes big bucks. A tractor could cost $80,000;
a combine, $100,000; to plant ten acres of corn, $1000
just for seed, fuel, and chemicals. Obviously, I thought,
these people.do plan. You cannot operate a big business
on sheer habit. If I could see how they plan perhaps I
could better create an intentional ministry among them.
"How do you decide when to plant?" I asked a friend
who farmed together with several other families. "I
mean, who makes the decision, you know, to figure if
you're past the last freeze or too late to catch the spring
rains?"
"We start the day someone gets out the tractor," he
replied.
"But you talk it over together first?"
"No, not really."
I knew he had to be half-kidding. But that meant he
was half-serious. There really were two worlds-theies
and mine. In my world decisions were made by planning, discussion, and scientific conjecture. In their
world these principles took a back seat to the brute force
of tradition.
Most appropriately, the teachers of my chauvinism
proved to be the soil and sky. In 1976, my wife Marci
and I put in our own garden. We did it as much to cut
down on food bills as anything el e. The prospect of
harvesting $200 worth of food out of $5 worth of seed
seemed too good an investment to pass by. All it took
was a little muscle.
We enjoyed the garden. There was a real atisfaction
from working the ground, turning the clay into soft,
receptive earth. It was creative. It was primal. It was
almost spiritual. Working the ground create a relationship between it and its worker. I learned many things
5

Both farmers and city dwellers have a vested interest in having enough food to eat
and in keeping cities habitable. For the welfare of the hungry world, the integrity
of the rural ethos needs respect and protection, not conversion into panurbation.

that summer. I learned to appreciate that amazing substance, dirt- how a small, dry clod, when pressed between thumb and finger, explosively yielded a cool
handful of moist earth. I learned that tilled soil not only
absorbs light but reflects it, and that good, fresh dirt
always throws back the image of a halo around the shadow of your head. I was a figure of nobility in my garden. There was something honest and primary about
what I did there, working in partnership with the Creator to raise the food that would allow us to live and work
some more. And nobody in the church seemed to mind
seeing me there.
The years before had been dry and the crops and farm
income had suffered. Winter's grip was broken early
that year. By February many of the farmers were already in the field, and the young corn caught the early
rains and was coming up a lively green that could grow
and mature before the summer rains failed. Then came
May 2nd. At sundown a cold front passed with a good,
drenching rain. The clouds cleared soon after midnight
and the wind stopped blowing. The next morning was
extremely brisk and clear-even cold; you could see
your breath. The next day I talked to my farmer friend.
"How's things going?" I asked.
"OK," he answered.
"Boy, the weather sure turned cooler, didn't it," I continued. Weather is always an appropriate first topic.
"Yeah," he said.
"How cold did it get at your place?"
"Eleven."
"Eleven! I had no idea it had gotten that cold. What
did it do to your corn?"
"Killed it all. '
I began to understand. You invest hundreds of thousands of dollars, much of it borrowed from a bank, and
sink it into the good earth. You do it because you have
done it before and this i your best gue of how to be
responsible with that amount of money. You feel apprehensive because you don't u ually plant that early;
you're going against the tradition. And then, out of that
cold night, the killing freeze wipes out every penny of
your investment.
There are places where planning is appropriate, but
there are also place in life which imply do not yield
to scientific analysis. It wa an intellectual-perceptual
tremor. My tectonic plates were moving again.
More insights came slowly through the next months.
I began to notice other curious things- about myself
when I had first arrived here and also about those who
came to visit from the city.
City dwellers never really ee anything in the country. "There's nothing out here!" they exclaim, ju t as I
once did. They really do not see the land, the crops, the
6

labor. For them it is all "without form and void"-a
chaos awaiting Development. Development means that
shopping centers and housing projects replace farmland.
The school district superintendent tells about a new
family that moved out from the city recently. "How do
you like it here?" he asked the parents after they had
settled in.
"Oh, it's really great. Nothing like raising kids in the
country! But there are two things you people out here
need."
"What?" asked the superintendent.
"Some parks and a swimming pool."
Or take the people who live in the housing development down the road. Lured to the project by the promise of "country living," they quickly organized a petition
to close down the feed lot across the road. They don't
like the smell.
Eventually they will win. They are packed in more
tightly than the rural families who have lived here for
generations. If votes were proportional to acreage, the
farming folk might have a chance. But 3,000 city
dwellers, complete with their urban ethos, can occupy
land that once supported ten or fifteen rural folk. Only
a little land is changed, but the entire voting complexion is altered, and land that has been rural for over a
hundred years is suddenly a part of the city. It is a fact
of life built into the way things are, a structural injustice
supported by perceptual presuppositions about reality.
It is urban chauvinism.
It's sad, this warfare between rural and urban, because both are potential political allies. Both farmers
and city dwellers have a vested interest in having enough
food to eat and in keeping the cities inhabitable. In an
urban culture such as ours, urban people belong in the
city, not in the ~ountry. And for the welfare of a hungry
world, the integrity of the rural ethos needs to be protected and respected rather than converted into something else. In spite of what city dwellers, ecclesiastical
bureaucrats, or well-intentioned-but-naive seminary
graduates might believe, the country and its people are
not undeveloped chaos waiting for someone to tame and
urbanize them so that they may discover their true
meaning and destiny. These are not people whom progress has passed by. They are, much like the blacks I had
come to know in Chicago, a people who have shaped a
life style consonant with the realities of their world. It is
a basic part of human decency to respect the integrity
of that creation. Anything else is chauvinistic.
Where will I go from here? I am not sure, but it will
probably take me to some new and strange place, a new
set of circumstances. Will I go there more open to that
new world, less likely to judge? I doubt it. I believe in
original sin. We all ·start out chauvinists at heart.
Cl

The Cresset

Christian Higher Education at the Crossroads
Part II: Theological and Philosophical Foundations of Christian Education
The purposes of these essays are:
(1 J to examine the current status of Christian higher education in historical perspective,
(2) to set forth some theological and philosophical bases for Christian higher education,
(3) to explore the ""idea" or ..nature" of the institution of higher education, and finally
(4) to offer directions for the mission of the Lutheran institution of higher education.

Robert V. Schnabel
Formal education today is the product of GrecoRoman and Judeo-Christian culture, augmented by
Arabian mathematics, preserved by Christian monasticism, renewed during the Renaissance and Reformation,
re-fashioned in the ages of Humanism, Rationalism,
and Enlightenment, and secularized in modern times
by new ideologies, sciences, and technologies. The secularizing forces of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have tended to blur the Christian consciousness of
the unity of life and learning in the divine order that
was a "given" for Christian communities in earlier ages.
Formal education, once the province of Christian communities, has largely been given over to the secular
state. Christian institutions of learning, once the fountainheads of knowledge and the instruments of a Christian cultural creativity that reckoned nothing alien to
the Gospel, have become seemingly expendable, fading
vestiges of an earlier age.
A significant evidence of the blurring of Christian
consciousness is the uncritical acceptance of the notion
that public educational institutions are fully adequate,
and that the raison d'etre of the schools still maintained
by Christians is to protect students from the wiles of
sensate culture and the intellectual challenges of "godless" sciences and arts. When Christian communities
take their theological affirmations seriously, however,
they are impelled-despite the costs-to shore up such
institutions of learning as they still have for, if they pass
out of existence, they will have to be re-invented. These
institutions of learning also need to be renewed from
within if they are to be citadels of Christian faith, liberal
and professional learning, and humane culture. For
this renewal to occur, those who now support and serve
such institutions of learning must act upon the theological affirmations that provide the philosophical foundations of Christian education.

Robert V. Schnabel is Publisher of the Cresset and President of Valparaiso University. This article is his second in a
series of four articles on the topic of Christian higher education which is being published in the Cresset during this academic year. The first article appeared in the September issue.
December, 1980

Human life is given meaning and direction by the
beliefs human beings have about themselves and the
world, and this is the case with both religious and nonreligious persons. All social institutions inescapably are
involved, informally and formally , in selecting, expressing, enacting, and transmitting under tandings,
beliefs, and values regarded as important. Institutions
of elementary, secondary, and higher education are social agencies designed especially for this purpose. Formal education is not only an intellectual enterprise, but
a social, cultural, spiritual, and moral enterprise as
well. Christians approach the task of education in full
awareness of this wholeness of the enterprise. The Christian faith is not simply a philosophy alongside other
philosophies, to be sure, but this faith does have implications for the philosophy of education, giving it a particular foundation, motivation , and direction.

In Light of the Law and the Gospel
There are many different belief- y tern and philosophical stances open to men. There is no significant
way a person may choose to hold or not hold ome b liefs, but only a choice of which belief to hold and
whether or not to examine them. Human b ing bas
their life-views on certain primary conviction , whether
we call these convictions "philo ophical" or "m taphy ical" or something else. While a knowl dging th philosopher's incapability of "proving" hi as umption ,
postulates, and philo ophical tatement of broade t
generalization, it i po ible to "do" philo phy in th
sense of giving a systematic account of lif ha d upon
fundamental conviction and of framin a h m of
most general interpretation in Ii ht of which th
1ments of human experience can b addr
d.
The revelation of God in Chri t inform Chri tian '
outlook on truth and value and guid their d i ion
and action in p r onal and o ial activitie includin
the social activity of education. Thi re elation dir
the Christian' life, guiding him thi
a rath r than
that way, and inform hi und r tandin of
man hi tory, and hi p r onal and ocial
In addre sing fundam ntal philo phical
tional que tion , the hri tian faith u
ingle ' philo ophy, th n a particular w
about life and ducation which at th
7

God's ..order of redemption" and .. order of creation" provide no basis for such
dichotomies as .. sacred and secular," ..holy and profane," and ..church and world."

careful account of God's justice and mercy, the law and
the Gospel. Conversely, Christians cannot accept any
approach to life and education that a priori rules out the
word of God. This is not an abridgement of freedom, for
ultimately no one escapes an initial structure of meaning and value, usually absorbed from the social milieu,
which influences his personal and social life.
Christians begin their philosophical reflection by taking account of the Scriptures where the nature of life
and the meaning of history are judged to be truly disclosed. The philosophy "done" by Christians is the
attempt to interpret, valuate, and organize life from the
standpoint of biblical Christian faith.

In Quest of Being and Human Being
The metaphysical quest is to discern the nature of
being or reality. Christians affirm that, while there are
many finite, created beings and kinds of being, God
alone is eternal, uncreated Being. By their own powers
of perception, conception, and judgment, men may
know in some dim way-without revelation- that there
is a divine being, but they are unable to know who this
divine being is or his will toward men. Men know who
God is only by God's self-disclosure. This understanding of a personal divine being, by whom all things were
made and are sustained, who entered history and guides
it to his ends cannot be k own except by God's selfrevelation. God made known his gracious will toward
mankind in the history of his chosen people of the Old
Covenant. He made himself known decisive! y in the
person and work of his incarnate Son, Jesu Christ, and
through his Spirit he extends the blessings of his Son to
his people of the New Covenant, the church. All that is,
is grounded in this personal God who discloses his purposes for mankind in the revelatory acts recorded in the
Old and New Testaments.
Belief that the world is created and pr erved by God
is the basis for the correlative beliefs that reality is ordered and intelligible and that all beings, except God,
bear the marks of dependent existence. The realm of
creation has positive significance and value. The natural
order is divinely created; it is not a realm of eternal
indestructible matter or energy or a elf-exi ting sy tern
of natural laws. The realm of creation is orderly and
dependable becau e it is grounded in the wisdom and
power of God, the dependable one. Since the realm of
created beings is from God, it is not only utterly dependent upon him, but because it is dependent upon
him, it is good. Creation, denoting both the original act
of bringing-into-being and the realm of exi ting beings,
is not evil of itself or the source of evil. The existence of
evil, although painfully real, does not diminish the
truth that what God has created is good and that what
8

has been corrupted will finally be restored by God. The
concepts of the "order of creation," the "order of redemption," and the "order of sanctification" express
distinctions which have Scriptural warrant, but these
concepts provide no basis for such dichotomies as "sacred and secular," "holy and profane," and "church and
world." Even after man's fall into sin, the created realm
is God's order, held together in his sustaining Word
and manifesting his goodness.
When God created man in his own image and like.ness, he fashioned an integral being, a person, a self, a
body-soul unity possessing complex powers. As a personal being, man is singular among created beings in
having certain divinely-given abilities, including selfconsciousness, linguistic and symbolic forms of thought
and expression, and the capability of conceiving ends
and moving toward them. The integrity of the human
person is constituted not simply by his being "an individual substance of rational nature" (as Aristotelian formulations of Latin Christianity put it), but by his distinctive relationship to God. The meaning of the term,
"created in the image and likeness of God," is that man
was created to be in fellowship with God and his fulfillment of being is in this fellowship. By turning from God
and to himself, this fellowship was broken. The integral
being of man has become alienated from God, and nothing about him is unaffected by this rupture.
It remains true, however, that all human beings, because of their divine creation and even in the fallen
state, by nature seek to know about themselves-their
origin, nature, and destiny. The image of God in the
sinner is, for all its brokenness, still the image of God.
A human being is still human-not an angelic being,
but not a brute. He has at least some intimations that
there is a mighty being or inscrutable power. He may
dimly grasp the meaning of St. Augustine's confession,
"O Lord, thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts
are restless until they rest in thee." He experiences the
reality of divine law in his awareness of the justice of
retribution: whatever a person does, he must bear the
consequences. He holds others, if not himself, accountable for their actions. Even in his fallen state, man lives
in God's ordered creation as a being of personal value,
a being who is always to be treated as a person, a subject, and never merely as an object or thing. The human
being's powers, although affected by the fall into sin, are
retained, and God intends that he should be a worker
with him in using his divinely-given powers.
A useful way to describe the nature of human reason
in the pursuit of knowledge is to distinguish two realms:
the realm of the created, temporal order and the realm
of Christ. Human reason is the appropriate power for
gaining understanding and control of the temporal
order. Rational powers-powers to perceive, conceive,
The Cresset
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judge, interpret, infer, explain-are competent to attain
knowledge ("warranted beliefs") concerning temporal
realities quite apart from the special revelation of God.
All human beings, Christian and non-Christian alike,
possess these divinely-given powers. When properly
used, these are among the best of divine gifts, also for
those who do not acknowledge their divine source. This
is not to say that reason is infallible or omnicompetent,
even in the temporal realm, but it is man's principal
means for coping with life in the natural and social
orders.
In the realm of Christ, the promises of God are not
fathomable by unaided human reason. Human beings
by nature cannot receive the things of the Spirit, for
they are spiritually discerned. The word of God, not
human reason, is the source and authority of knowledge
in this realm. God mediates grace and truth by his Word.
By the scriptures and sacraments God empowers human beings to receive and live by his grace and truth,
and the appropriate "organ of knowledge" in this realm
of Christ is faith. Scriptural truth and Christian affirmations may be stated in propositional form, of course,
and reason is needed to apprehend the meaning and to
give assent to what is asserted. However, faith is not
mere notional assent but personal trust in the Word of
God. The fruit of this trust is a transformed life in
Christ. The church is the fellowship of the redeemed
people of God, a community of faith and love whose
members know that "God is love" and that he discloses
his nature and purpose, his last word, as love for mankind through Christ.

In Pursuit of Knowledge and Truth
The earthly realm of scientific understanding in the
natural order and in performing civil works in the social
order is reason's domain. Natural and social phenomena
are approached and interpreted in various ways, depending on the way questions are framed and on the
kinds of methods of discovery used in a particular
science. When the purpose of an inquiry is to understand human beings and their behavior, different
sciences will present findings appropriate ~o the particular methods employed, and Christians joyfully support and engage in such varied studies. But Christians
also insist that no science can rule out the Christian understanding of man's origin, nature, and destiny on
purely scientific grounds. Withal, the Christian interpretation of man is possible only if the interpreter brings
his Christian way of looking at things with him.
Although the "organs of knowledge" in the two realms
are different, there is a sense in which reason may be
properly employed in the service of the realm of Christ.
Intelligence may be put to work on an entirely new set
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of presuppositions drawn from faith; reason, enlightened by faith, can grasp matters of the Spirit to a degree. Intelligence can be used to interpret the temporal
order in light of revealed truth. Christians are called not
only to live and work in the world, but to transform the
world. They are called to serve Christ, nurture the
spirit, and enact education within the temporal order;
for although the things of the Spirit are eternal they
can be realized only when acted upon in specific times
and places with particular persons. The Christian faith
sees the temporal realm as the place where the life of the
mind and the life of the Spirit are lived. Work takes on
the character of a sacred calling in the common life because service in meeting human needs is willed by God.
It is not enough to have a good will to serve. In our complex civilization, knowledge drawn from the temporal
order is needed by those who would serve the Gospel.
Judgment as to the nature of knowledge is inseparable
from a view as to what is to qualify as a true proposition.
The three common views of truth are often referred to
as the correspondence, the coherence, and the pragmatic theories of truth.
The correspondence theory is that "truth" is the fidelity of a judgment to objective reality, the conformity of
a proposition to the actual state of affairs. It is agreement of a "statement of fact" and the "objective order"
to which it points.
The coherence theory of truth is offered as a corrective to the correspondence theory and asserts that the
test of the truth of propositions is al o the nature of truth.
According to the coherence theory, a proposition is true
when it is logically in agreement with all previously
established true beliefs. A true judgment i one that i
consistent with other judgments generally accepted or
taken to be true. A true judgment fits in with accepted
knowledge, and it is accepted as true becau e it explains
(or explains better) phenomena le adequat ly explained by other judgments.
The pragmatic version of truth d nie the a umptions of the other two theorie : that there i a fixed reality and unchanging truth. Thi theory a erts that truth
is "made" in the proce s of ucce ful human adju tment to the flux of reality and the tream of human e perience. A hypothe is which ucce fully olve problems is the "true" hypothe i .
In the cour e of human affair the e thr th orie of
truth may be u ed at one time or another, parately or
jointly. In daily life the corre ponden e criterion i
applied in dealing with fact in eking to determin
whether judgmen about them faithfully coincide with
the ob ervable world, and in t ting wh th r p rceptions, conceptions, judgment hypoth e , and th orie
are in accord with the fa . In oth r in tanc
notably
when judgments cannot b compared with a tual itua9

In the Christian life faith is not only not separable from reason, but faith is the response
required for grasping the divine truth which locates the wholesome and proper work of reason .

tions, beliefs are tested in terms of their internal consistency and their truth is affirmed when they cohere
with an accepted body of knowledge. Particularly in
fields of systemic knowledge, such as mathematics apd
other formal sciences, the coherence theory is most
appropriate. And in daily life the truth of an assertion
sometimes must be judged by the consequences experienced when the assertion is acted upon. The truth about
"truth" is that all three of these theories are needed to
account for truth-seeking and truth-getting in human
affairs.
Religious and moral truth does not fall under the
foregoing criteria in any direct way. The only adequate
source of truth about God, and also about man's origin,
nature, and destiny, is divine revelation . While human
beings can discover truth about the natural and social
worlds by use of reason, divine truth is given by God.
All truth derives ultimate! y from the creator of all being
to whom all truth belongs and who keeps truth forever.
Truth discovered by man is always relative to and corrigible by that truth about God and man which is divinely revealed. Ordinary truths ("true beliefs") in the natural order are tentative and changing, their meaning
and validity rightly seen only in relation to the truth
that is divinely revealed. Divine truth is different from
humanly-apprehended truths framed in conceptual
judgments. Divine truth is not the product of human
effort, is not a truth in general concept , but truth in the
singular-as singular as God himself.
The Old Testament words for truth (emunah, emath)
signify the faithful dependability of God; his truth i a
quality of his steadfast love. Applied to man, "truth"
means walking in accord with the will of God in his
covenant promise. In the ew Te tam nt, the Hebrew
understanding of "truth" is linked with the Greek concept of truth (aletheia) as the unveiling of the real and permanent as contrasted to the merely apparent and changing; hence "truth" is that which has reliability and stability. This truth is not something merely to be grasped
intellectually, but something to be done. It is adverbial: "doing truly." The truth of God is set over
against human falsenes , and hi truth in Chri t takes
precedence over all other modes of truth. The truth of
the Gospel is expre ed not primarily in the form of
propositions but in historical events and per on . God
communicates his truth in a per on: J e u Chri t. This
truth i not merely cognized but is grasped by the power
of the Spirit in a per on's life lived in re ponse to him.
What human being need mo tis not truth in the abstract or intellectual sen e, but Truth-God him elf.
The most important need i not under tanding and controlling the force of nature, however great the temporal
significance of such activitie may be; the most needed
truth is that given in Jesus Christ, the truth of God's
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grace and his gift of new life. This is the truth that Christ
is and that he brings into the world. This is why the
language of God's truth must not be confused with the
language of human truth theories. Divine truth is given
to human beings not to give them scientific or historical
information, but to give them salvation. This truth is
not earned by reason, but is given by God to faith.
To have this divine truth is not merely to. reflect upon
it but to live in it and, indeed, to live it. God's Spirit
leads human beings into this truth to be lived as the people of God. This truth makes for fellowship with God
and, consequently, fellowship with other persons. The
evidence of this truth, like that of love, is the evidence
of experience, and the signs of this living truth are the
gifts of the Spirit and the fruits of faith. This truth is
related to that worship "in Spirit and in truth" which
faithfully expresses the truth God has given to all men
in Jesus Christ-the way, the truth, and the life. In so
far as human beings receive this truth they are empowered to live with one another in newness of life before God and to worship him in truth. This truth is thus
not separable from moral and spiritual values.

In the Realm of Spiritual Values
Choices presuppose a scale of values to which a person is consciously or unconsciously committed. These
values represent a person's basic allegiances. In unregenerate persons, such allegiances are idolatrous and
need to be replaced by the "values" which God himself
establishes. Moral values cannot be separated from divine commands and promises. God addresses man in
his word of law and Gospel, each with its own proper
task to perform. Both the law and the Gospel are addressed to all men- regenerate and unregenerate alike
-and apply throughout their lives. The law expresses
God's righteous demand that men conform their wills
to his will, that they be holy as he is holy. The divine
values expressed in the law expose the values of men as
inherently self-centered and mortally destructive of
their relationship with God, with one another, and with
their own true selves. The Gospel is the good news of
God's forgiveness of sin by grace, which men receive by
faith in Christ, who gave himself to death on the cross
in behalf of sinners, assuring them of their reconciliation with God not on the basis of their own "keeping of
the law," but as a divine gift.
Christian moral values and ethics are a working out of
the implications of God's claims and demands as lawgiver and judge, of his gifts in Christ as justifier and
redeemer, and of his gifts of the Spirit as sanctifier. Philo ophical ethics are concerned with the standards of
action by which men may discern the good and the right
and follow after them. If ethicists see their project as
The Cresset
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human self-acceptance through moral achievement,
then Christians state that what alone enables men to accept themselves honestly, especially in the face of the
law's withering accusations, is the truth that they are
accepted by God on account of the atonement of Jesus
Christ. Genuine self-acceptance cannot be attained by
human modes of self-justifying action, certainly not by
evasions of moral responsibility or lowering the criteria
of moral behavior. It can come only by relying on what
God has done in Ch:r:ist and on what he is still doing by
his Spirit to bestow that faith in him which renews life.
All human efforts at self-justification through moral
achievement fail to restore men to true life. Only if God
maintains his justice and is yet merciful can newness of
life be received, and only if God overcomes men's alienation from him and accepts them can men accept themselves and truly live.
It follows that human behavior, in order to qualify as
morally good, is good because God makes it so by graciously forgiving and sanctifying it. Christian ethics is
not based on a search for righteousness by human standards of achievement. Rather, Christian ethics is rooted
in grace since only such actions of men as are expressions of faith can be genuinely good. "Good" is wholly
the work of God in the justified man. God alone can
bring about man's moral well-being because justification is accomplished only through his grace.
The Christian ethic is one of faith-active-in-love.
Justified men owe nothing to God and to neighbor but
love. Christians are free persons, but they are not to turn
their freedom into license; they are to be servants to one
another in love. The whole of the law can be summed
up in a single command: You shall love the Lord
your God with your whole being and your neighbor as
yourself. Christians are not only to give the neighbor
his due, but by grace are free to go beyond moral duty,
to love the neighbor as Christ loved them. The new person
places all moral obligations in the context of love and
will not be yoked to legalism or moralism. He is called
to obedience to God, not that by prudential self-interest
he might serve his own ends, but as a faithful servant of
God be of service to God's people.
The love of Christians for their fellows ~ s the same
love with which they themselves are loved by God in
Christ. It is not love as feeling, based on the attractiveness of another. It is not simply friendliness rooted in
common benefits to be gained from co-operation. It is
not mere abstention from hurting others. It is a positive
and costly giving of oneself to the neighbor, as Christ
gave himself. Christ did not merely exhort men to love;
he enacted the divine love by his own sacrifice for mankind. The Gospel proclaims, not that God has explained
what love is, but that in Christ God is love, meeting the
impasse of sin by suffering it to death in a costly act
December, 1980

which upholds God's righteous judgment and at the
same time expresses his grace and mercy. It is this kind
oflove God gives to his people and calls forth from them.
It is then clear that love, like faith , is not a matter of
mere words, but of action. When men love God in
Christ, they dwell in him and he enlivens them by his
Spirit. For persons to be "in Christ" means to love others
actively as Christ loved them. God's new imperative"Be who you are"-is really an indica~ive growing out
of the justified person's relationship to Christ. If this
relationship is broken, God's commands again become
a condemning law. But under grace, what is demanded
is given by the power of God's Spirit. Men cannot love
as God's people unless they stand in the faith that trusts
God's abiding love toward them.

In the Tr uth Gi ven by God to Faith
Many moral philosophers have stated that the moral
value of an act depends primarily on the motive or the
intention or principle from which it arises on the part of
the moral agent. If we use this kind of language about
morals, then Christians identify the primary motive of
their actions as gratefulness to God. They recognize that
their works are pleasing to God only when they flow
from thankfulness to God for all his gifts. The Christian
ethic is a consequent ethic: because of what God has
done for men, they are now set free to share this love.
But the new life in God's love is never complete. There
is no thought here of moral perfectionism. In every
human act the taint of sin remains. This, too, God cover
in the folds of his grace. In every daily moral choice,
Christians find that repentance mu t alway precede
and follow renewal, even as they need alway to rely on
the unfailing loving kindness of God. Wron choic s
will be made. Even then, God as ure hi p opl of hi
unending grace. For Christians, God' ev rla ting promise is his last word. This i more than enough.
These affirmations of faith are ignificant in many
ways. Christian education, grounded in God word, i
not to be limited to formal religiou in truction. A
integral beings, men have been gi en piritual moral,
intellectual , esthetic, ocial phy ical and cultural
powers which are to b develop d in prop r r lationship and according to their e ential de e of importance. Chri tian affirmation about er ation ignify that
studies of the natural ord r are of intrin i value in
man's temporal exi tence. he mandat
d a
to
human beings to ubdue nature and to b t wards of
the created order I nd to tudi of nature, to ientifi
and technological di ciplin a charact r that i divin
in ource and end. The realm of natur i th r at d
and creative " eminarium' of
d ho brou ht forth
the univer e to manife t hi lo . Human b in ar
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Growth in Christ is implied in the whole of education, and Christian education has no limits
in length or depth, no division in time or place for '"spiritual" and other forms of education.

responsible for the proprietorship of the tiny corner of
the universe where they are placed. In fulfilling this
responsibility, Christians have the obligation to develop
their powers in observing and interpreting natural
phenomena, in acquiring knowledge of man, in removing ignorance and enlarging the body of knowledge.
It is a great benefit to learn to work scientifically, with
methods of observation, experimentation, analysis, and
formulation of findings in precise, quantitative terms
and in statements that are publicly verifiable. By use of
scientific methods, men are helped in controlling, redirecting, and husbanding the forces and resources of
nature. A great purpose of education is to provide means
by which human beings can learn to do these things in
the most effective and responsible ways possible.

In the Wholeness of Christian Education
Human beings are more than intellectual beings.
They are beings invested with the creative imagination
to express their intimations of beauty with a variety of
arts. It is part of their freedom and joy to appreciate
and develop the insights and skills of creative imagination associated with languages, literature, and the arts.
Since the development of spiritual and moral beliefs
and values cannot be divorced from intellectual and
esthetic maturation, and since attitudes and appreciations are fashioned in the context of the whole of life, a
person's growth in Christ is implied in the whole of education as well as the whole of life. Such education in
wholeness has no limits in length or depth, no division
in place and time for "spiritual" education and other
forms of education.
The sciences and arts are to be viewed in the larger
perspective of divine revelation; they concern and discern the things available to natural powers, but the
truth illuminating those powers come only from God's
revelation of grace. This di tinction is to be held firm.
Any irrational fideism that would depreciate the legitimate place and role of human powers in their proper
sphere is to be rejected. Also to be rejected is the kind
of positivism that limits knowledge to what is derivable
from sense experiences, and the kind of rationalism that
allows nothing to be true save that which is deduced
from "self-evident principles of rea on." In the Christian life, faith is not only not eparable from rea on- it
is not that even for the rationalist or po itivist, who invests his own kind of faith in rea on or en e experience
- but is the mode of respon e prerequisite to gra ping
the divine truth which locate the whole ome work of
reason.
Since the God to whom the Chri tian belong is the
God to whom all things in the world belong Chri tian
have no reason to withdraw from the work of the world
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but every reason to make the world's work their own,
as workers together with God. As they await the New
Age in its fullness, Christians are already busy with its
kind of life, here and now. To be sure, there is always
tension between the Old Age and the New Age, yet
there is a positive side to temporal events. Indeed there
is no end to the rich variety of good things human
beings can enjoy in their temporal lives. Of these the
Apostle Paul says:
Think about these things . and keep thinking about whatever things
are honorable and true. just and pure. lovely and gracious; if there
are any things of excellence or worthy of praise. look out for them .
learn to recognize them . search out their nature. study them. know
their worth and prove their value. appropriate and enjoy them .

Life has a thousand aspects to interest men's minds, to
give proper place for cultivation of their sensitivities
and sensibilities, to engage their energies and to afford
full scope for their varied abilities.
Outside the church as well as within it there are many
laudable expressions of earnest devotion, nobility,
beauty, honor, duty, and truth. Christians praise these
things, seek to promote them, and give thanks for them.
But Christians also know that intellectual, cultural, and
moral achievements have to do with earthly life, not
with justifying their lives before God. As they live in
the temporal realm, Christians also live in the realm of
Christ. They await the victorious coming of their Lord,
when the full restoration of the image of God in men
will grant them full fellowship with God. They await the
time when they will live in joy with God in the realized
New Age, when the tension of the already-completedbut-not-yet-fulfilled will have ended. Their education
is to initiate them into that kind of living now and prepare them for that eternal destiny.
As Christians live in the temporal realm, they affirm
the value of intellectual and scientific work for the understanding, control, and stewardship of natural forces
and resources. They rejoice in the cultivation and expression of creative imagination in all the arts. Since
Christian education nurtures learners in their full Vocation in the temporal realm and the realm of Christ,
the development of their varied natural abilities for the
art and sciences is to be undergirded and complemented
by instruction in the truths of the Christian faith. This
includes proclaiming and teaching the word of God,
celebrating the sacraments of divine grace, nurturing
the Christian life of faith-active-in-love, and training
for witness and service.
It is ome such vision, presented here in all too summary form that helped to fashion the universities that
played a vital role in the development of western civilization. In sub equent articles in this series we shall turn
our attention to the nature of higher education and the
idea of a Lutheran university.
••

••
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Foreign films and American movies often move toward a
shared cinematic world where Hollywood conventions are
more often altered by foreign admiration than destroyed.

The Confrontation
Between Nature
And Imagination
The New World Setting
And Old World Idiom In
Aguirre, The Wrath of God
Richard Maxwell
Now Henry is unmistakably a Big One.
Funnee; he don't feel so.
He just stuck around.
The German and the Russian films into
Italian and Japanese films turned , while
many were prevented from making it.
- 7 7 Dream Songs

So John Berryman on growing up
in America: he wishes "he could
squirm again where Hoot/is just
ahead of rustlers," but the foreign
films keep intruding on this dream
of childhood. Changing nationality
- as if to mark the passing of timethey drag him away from Hollywood and from youth.
A lot of people in Berryman's generation must have this kind of memory. Instead of Westerns, they got
Akira Kurosawa. This was an un-
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settling change, harbinger of things
to come. Not, however, so unsettling
as it might have seemed. The relationship between foreign films and
Hollywood often moves both sides
towards a shared vocabulary, a
shared cinematic world. Well to remember that Kurosawa's samurai
film Yojimbo led to a string of Italian
Westerns in which Clint Eastwood
got his start. After a while Eastwood's
director, Serge Leone, won the budget and the stars to make the internationally financed Once Upon a
Time in the West, starring Henry
Fonda. Once upon a time indeed!
Fonda, who starred as Wyatt Earp
in John Ford's My Darling Clementine, is the perfect figure to close this
particular circle. He now inhabits a
genre utterly transformed. Berryman implies that the aesthetic laws
of the old Hollywood can't survive
such onslaughts. Like youth or innocence, they are irretrievable. To
which we might reply: Hollywood
conventions are altered more often
than destroyed- altered, moreover,
by foreign admiration as well as by
foreign indifference.
Berryman was writing in the early
sixties. Since that time, Italian and
Japanese have turned into French
and once more into German films.
At first sight, the New German Cinema affords one further example of
a grand cultural mixup on the international movie scene. Directors like
R.W. Fassbinder and Wim Wenders
follow a customary pattern by studying Hollywood products (the melodra~nas of Douglas Sirk, American
film noir) before assimilating this influence into presumably avant-garde
films. These men borrow Hollywood conventions, then take them to
pieces: a much-honored form of
filmmaking. On the other hand,
while the Fassbinder and Wender
product is often high-quality, we've
seen this kind of recycling a little
too often.
The third of the younger German

directors to get attention from American audiences is Werner Herzog, a
less predictable figure. Herzog's
sympathies are with the high culture
of Eastern Europe rather than a popular tradition like Hollywood's.
When he made a vampire film it
was based on Murnau's Nosferatu;
when he went to the theater for inspiration he chose to film Buchner's
Wozzeck. This studied distance from
Hollywood conventions and idioms
has allowed Herzog an unexpected
privilege. His movies are Foreign
Films, to be sure, but by this very
token he has become one of the few
European directors to create a great
work about the New World. Aguirre,
the Wrath of God-made 1973, premiered in Valparaiso 1980-establishes an original hybrid between
New World setting and Old World
idiom. It does so byway of that quintessential American theme, the search
for El Dorado.
The plot of Aguirre is simple. A
sixteenth-century Spanish expedition attempts to conquer the Amazon river basin. The advance party
of the expedition is taken over by
the power-mad Aguirre, who appoints a puppet Emperor of El Dorado, then leads the Emperor and hi
men (all hoping for gold) to extinction in the heart of the wilderne .
Aguirre is the last urvivor. As the
film end , he continues to float down
the river on a j rry-built raft. urrounded by hi dead m n (and hi
dead daught r) he plan ever-greater conque t.
The movie i about a megalomaniac, Hitlerian geniu - o ay the
review . To be more p cific, it i
about what uch a eniu might do if
he found him If in th
mazon.
Europe contain no pace quite like
the . We confront a myth of th
ew World, e p cially of its tropical outh rn half. h point i clear
from th fir t momen of th film,
when a train of oldi
and lav
wind up and around om impo -
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By way of the quintessentially American theme of the search for El Dorado,
Herzog becomes one of a few European directors to create a great New World
film-in which a microcosmic society of exploiters breaks down into chaos.
sible Peruvian mountains. Herzog
must have gotten his cameras up
here the same way the Spanish got
their cannons, by dint of pushing
and pulling. The soundtrack is dominated by a wordless choral chant:
for once this hackneyed device is
appropriate, registering an awe that
the images truly substantiate. It is
important for Herzog to establish a
weird atmosphere here at the very
start. By this means he (and Aguirre)
will get away with murder.
Seldom have there been great
films about exploration from Hollywood or anywhere else- nothing,
certainly, to match the above-mentioned tradition of the Western, with
its complicated diffusion on the international scene. The exploration
of the New World is perhaps a difficult subject for the movies. The
Western usually aims for some reasonable balance between wildness
and civilization: most of John Ford's
films can be seen to dramatize this
interplay, imagining a moment
when the West can finally be tamed.
Explorers, on the other hand, don't
confront a half-civilized place. They
march into a territory so alien it
seems merely empty. Marcio Souza's
The Emperor of the Amazon, a recent
bestseller in Brazil, makes the point
elegantly:
I am the prisoner of a paysage . . .
[writes the novel's hero]. The beach was a
no-man's-land, and I began to reflect upon
the challenge what such a landscape represented for literature. See how civilized I
am? Lost in the jungle but busy pondering
literary problems. Problems which , incidentally, I never managed to work out. I
only know that such preoccupation with
nature effaces human character. And that
the Amazonian landscape is so complex in
its detail that, inevitably, we are led to victimize its contours with sonorous-sounding
adjectives, sacrificing the real in all its
grandeur.1

The Amazon can be understood as a
1

The Emperor of the Amazon was recently
translated by Thomas Colchie and published in paperback by Avon/Bard. See pp.
75-80 of this edition for the hero's first confrontation with the Amazon.
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void, an unfillable emptiness. "It is
the largest hydrographic basin in
the world and the only one that has
not bequeathed an important civilization to the history of man." Half
in the spirit of parody, half in desperation, Souza pours literary conventions into the Amazon, which
continues to be-the Amazon, nothing more nor less. For the explorer,
at any rate, this territory wipes out
all sense of a shared social or aesthetic reality. Herzog, I hope to
show, approaches the tropical wilderness similarly-finding, however,
his own idiosyncratic solutions to
the problem stated by the novelist.
Herzog seems to have mastered
some appropriate techniques before
he discovered their use. A microcosmic society of exploiters and victims breaks down into chaotic solipsism. This condition is communicated by the fixed stare of the camera
on grotesque images and situations.
Herzog's formula, as thus described,
sounds like run-of-the-mill European
absurdism until it is transferred
from the claustrophobic Old World
to the infinitely spacious Amazon.2
The New World reinvigorates this
plot- makes it the vehicle of a confrontation between imagination and
nature. Time and again, nature swallows imagination whole.
One or two examples will have to
stand for many. When Aguirre's
chief henchman beheads a malingerer from behind, the head flies off
the body, lands in the dirt, then continues to speculate on the chances of
getting home-of retracing all those
bends in the mighty Amazon. After
a moment, its speculations cease.
This is an odd joke and a good one.
Heads cannot talk after they are
severed from bodies, but the fact
that this one does surprises neither
Aguirre nor his men. While the
2

One can see an early version of this formula
in Herzog's Even D warfs Started Small
(1970).

Amazon presents itself as the perfect
world for adventure- for making a
name- not even miracles have much
of an impact. The void cannot be
filled by even the most fantastic happenings.
Once we understand this point,
we can grasp Aguirre's dilemma.
The adventurer is after fame even
more than wealth. His ambition is
that there should be a story to be
told about him. It is not surprising
that Aguirre's grandiloquent gestures eventually become suicidal.
His goal is not, ultimately, the practical building of an actual empire.
He wants to leave a mark on this, the
blankest part of the world, and if he
has to march himself and all his men
to death, so be it. Immediately after
the beheading scene, Aguirre gives
the great speech where he wills himself to be the Wrath of God. The
birds will drop down dead from the
trees the moment he orders them
to do so. So he says. The claim is
patently untrue, but no matter:
Aguirre strains to make his own
myth, which will subdue the myth
of the Amazon.
And does he succeed? The question here is essentially a question of
storytelling, of how and by whom
the story is told and what kind of
impact it has. Aguirre does, in fact,
possess a floating, anonymous narrator. Many of the scenes are accompanied by a voiceover giving dates
and data, sometimes rendering
moral or logistical judgments. The
voice must belong to a member of
the expedition, but we are not exactly told which member- not until the
very end, when the "I" on the soundtrack can be linked to the expedition's priest. Now for the payoff.
Moments after the priest is finally
established as the film's narrator, he
is wiped out by an Indian attack. We
pin our narrator down, then instantly lose him. We are left inside a
world shaped by Aguirre's final
monologue, in which he swears to
The Cresset

Herzog's Aguirre reduces
the American adventure
story to absurdity.
marry his recently-deceased daughter and so repopulate the Amazon.
The camera makes wide, sweeping
circles around the conqueror's raft,
freeing us from this mad solipsism
but planting it in our memories too.
Aguirre has won his victory. The
more impotently fabulous his oaths,
the finer his peculia,:- triumph.
Herzog's reductio ad absurdum of
the adventure story could never
create its own genre. There will be
no John Ford for the cinema of exploration.3 This eccentric film,
moving outside the conventions and
anti-conventions of Hollywood, has
nonetheless a significant historical
point. Where the Western populates
the wilderness, tames it in one way
or another, Aguirre asserts that the
void is always there. The New World
is fundamentally unlike the Old, for
while it may belong to the Indians it
can never belong to us. This is an
interesting proposition to discuss at
a moment when the Amazon is being
picked over by some highly-efficient
international corporations. Perhaps
this impossible river basin will one
day look like a suburb? Maybe, but
it will be the Amazon still, a place
where trad ition of the European
kind is almost a contradiction in
terms. Aguirre's dilemma- the German vision of a Spanish expedition
up the Amazon- may communicate,
however distortedly, some of our
own abiding fear: our sense of an
emptiness in American cultures. To
put this another way, the suburbs
may be more like the Amazon than
we think. John Berryman, who
sometimes seemed to be the Aguirre
of poetry, would probably have
agreed. His four hundred Dream
Songs are one more unfollowable
act in the grand New World fashion.
Herzog's highly European film now
joins this unsociable Pantheon. Cl
3

Aguirre will never create its own genre .. •
but it does have some striking similarities
with Apocalypse Now. Coppola's film is, by
comparison, strident and graceless.
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Klaus Kinski as Aguirre
In Aguirre, The Wrath of God

After
D ryness

Photograph By
New Yorker Films

The leaves turn back.
That means rain they said.
Water lilies firm and glow.
I long to pray again.
Clouds thicken and grow black.
Beetles hug the compost bed.
Wind pulls at air like ~n 1:1ndertow.
I try to pray again.
Ripple grasses bend their crown.
Stones slide into the magnet lak
The mocking bird is dumb.
I listen to my heartbeat say
The meadow pulls the young wheat down.
Thorn bushes lance and quake.
Then the rains come.
There is no other human wayI long to pray again.
I try to pray again.
I listen to my heartbeat say
There is no other human way
To be-except to pray.
I pray!

Sister Maura
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He satisfies the hunger
of the multitude

David Rybat
Laurie Gate
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Theatre

We always sense the frustration of our finite existence.
In ritual we transcend the limitations of our condition.
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The Roots of Ritual
A Sabbatical Journal
Nelvin Vos
I am sitting in the warm April
sun. Surrounding me are the low
hills of Argos, and far below me is
the orchestra, a circular area about
fifty feet in diameter. Rows and rows
of tiered stone seats (I count sixtyfive rows as I climb to the topmost
one) are arranged in a perfect half
circle. The guide lights a match as
she stands in the center of the orchestra; I can hear the match strike
in the top row. She chatter on while
I imagine Oedipus or Ore tes triding in front of the pro cenium. For I
am sitting in the theatre at Epidaurus, built in the fourth century B.C.
On this hollowed-out hill ide ome
twelve thousand people view each
performance of the Greek play produced here during the ummer
months. The power of the ancient
ritual of Dionysus is still pre ent.
A dramatic tradition impres e
itself upon u , aid a recent critic
Nelvin Vo is Head of the English Department at Muhlenberg College, Allentown, Pennsylvania. Last ear Fortress
Press published his Monday' Ministries, a discussion of the ministry of the
laity, and this year Eerdmans published
his The Great Pendulum of Becoming, in whi'ch Mr. Vos traces the images
of chaos, bestiality, and impotence in
modern drama.
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not first of all as a series of dates or
plot outlines, but as a cluster of
images, a montage of particular persons. To think of a play is to see a
person in action.
A powerlul hulk of a man, shackled
to a rock, shouts defiance to the
heavens; an avenging queen persuades her returning conquerorhus band to walk in pride upon the
red carpet; a king with the nobility
of a demigod exclaims:
It was true! All the prophecies! NowLight, may I look on you for the last time.

Near all of these persons within the
acting area is an altar for sacrifice to
the gods. The community, the polis,
is visibly present in the chorus.
Most important, all of what takes
place is completely open; the brilliance of the sun illumines all of the
action. The spectator in the theater
is thus confronted with the principal
symbols, the ultimate foundations of
his world- the social and the heavenly order, the city, the palace, the
temple, the abode of the mysterious
gods. The Greek dramatist saw man
as directly related, connected, if you
will, with his communitas, the world
of Nature, and the arena of the gods.
The Greek actor-doer is affected by
all of reality, and when he falls, the
repercu sions affect the whole of the
universe.
It is no coincidence that the
Greek bequeathed the word "cosmo " to all of civilization. The roots
of the term "cosmic" -vast, grandiose, orderly, the universe as a
whole- are apparent, for when the
pectator is in the theatre, the mountain , the sea, and the sky are all
visibly pre ent. The ritualistic actions of the protagonist take place
within the pattern of the cosmos as a
whole.

II
This time I am tanding. In fact,
I have been standing for almost four
hour . The place: inside a brilliantly white stuccoed village church at

Kampos on the holy and beautiful
island of Patmos, the site of the revelation of John (Revelation 1 :9). T he
time: 3 a.m. on Easter Sunday morning. I continue to peel wax from my
fingers, for the candle I hold scutters
its flame as the April draught comes
through the open window. I am p articipating in the ritual of the Easter
Vigil which had begun at 11 p.m . on
Good Saturday.
As part of my sabbatical this past
semester, I had decided to spend
some time exploring the meanings
of ritual. Ritual is a topic one can
read about, and I did so, some three
dozen books, in fact. But I also wanted to participate in, get closer to, the
practice of ritual. Rome? Too busy
during Holy Week. Jerusalem? Still
more so. Why not Greece, where out
of religious rites evolved drama and
where the Orthodox, in contrast to
Western Christendom, see Easter as
the central event of the liturgical
year?
So for two weeks in late March and
early April, I traveled alone in
Greece, the first several days centering in Athens with side trips to Corinth, Mycenae, and Epidaurus. And
then, a ship to Patmos on Saturday,
arriving at midnight, precisely at
the beginning of Holy Week in the
first minutes of Palm Sunday.
I left on Easter Monday evening
after a festive celebration in the
square of the island's only port,
Scala. Lamb, bread, and white wine
was spread on tables for all. Afterwards, three fiddlers with ancient
and craggy faces provided the music
for the simple line dances of the
young people. The rest of us made a
circle for the dancers, clapped our
hands, and wished one another: Kali
Paschal (Good Easter!) The paschal
lamb had been slain, and all of usa sprinkling of German, Dutch, and
American travelers and a good number of the 2500 residents of the island
-were participating in the celebration of rebirth and renewal. Could
John have foreseen: "And the angel
The Cresset

In drama both the actors and the audience enter a community of suspended disbelief.
It is the art of shared response, for in drama the community is talking to itself.
said to me, Write this: 'Blessed are
those who are invited to the marriage
supper of the Lamb.' "
The whole week was a pilgrimage.
I walked on most of the roads of the
small island (about fifteen square
miles), reading aloud the book of
Revelation and later the four Passion narratives as stations on my
journey. The serenity of the sea and
the peacefulness of the land refreshed my body, mind, and spirit.
And the ceremonies of Holy Week
made the concept "ritual" concrete
and meaningful.

III
Palm Sunday morning, I left my
pension early. Only a few people
were on the narrow streets of the
village. I asked an old woman
dressed all in black: Church? No
response. Kirche? Kerk? That is the
extent of my languages. Impulsively, I made the sign of the cross. Ah!
the ritual is universal. She points
and bids me follow her. A few minutes later, we are in the courtyard of
a church. She points me toward the
center door, and she goes in one of
the side doors. I enter. Males are in
the center; women and girls are on
either side.
The bread is being blest. Huge
circular loaves, eighteen inches in
diameter, are taken out the door
near me. Persons of all ages, including young males in three-piece
suits, keep entering, put down a coin
or two, take a small candle, light it
from another candle, place it in the
round stand, and then kiss the icon,
a painting of the procession of Christ
on Palm Sunday. Palms shaped into
the form of small crosses are all
over, hanging from the lights, in the
windows, and held by almost everyone.
A youngster of perhaps four or
five years begins to be a bit restless.
fter all, we have been standing for
a good hour. He imitates the sound
and movement of a helicopter with
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his palm cross. The palm and the
etymology of helicopter (Gr.: helix,
a spiral + pieron, wing) have existed
here for at least a millenium, but
only a mid-twentieth century child
would image a helicopter.
I catch very little of the sermon,
only occasional words: theos, agape,
laos, phenomena. But the liturgy, the
work of the laos, communicates
through eye and ear and nostril.
The chalice is raised, and later the
bread is brought back in. The wooden baskets contain huge chunks of
bread, two inches square and larger.
No stiff pattern of line-up takes
place in the distribution of the Sacrament. The males first, later the
females, gather round the priest. As
if a father giving a piece of candy to
each child who is waiting, the priest
blesses each receiver. All this takes
place spontaneously and joyfully.
And with that communality, we
leave the church, eating the bread
as we go. The Body of Christ is carried into the world.
IV
On Maunday Thursday, I climb
the steep path to Chora, the village
in which the Monastery of St. John
is located. A modern road zigzags to
the top, but on the cobblestone path,
I meet goatherds with their bellringing flocks and old men on don-

keys, all of whom would seem at
home in the eighth century or before.
Vagilis Square is abuzz with activity. The stage for the drama is being
set: a wooden platform about thirty
feet square and three feet high.
Graceful wire arches of palm leaves
and fresh flowers (I think they are
lavender) surround the platform.
Silver and gold shields shimmer in
the sunlight above some of the arches; the oil lamps on the other arches
seem appropriate on this island of
the Apocalypse. The fragrance of the
flowers and of the incense in the
lamps blend with one another.
(Other than high Anglicans, what
western Christians require the sense
of smell for worship?) Not another
person could fit into the square.
On the platform arranged in two
rows facing one another are twelve
chairs with one chair elevated a bit
at the front. Precisely at 11, twelve
priests, vested in rich scarlet and
yellow, enter the quare in ingle
procession, followed by the bearded
figure of Christos. They eat themselves, and the ritual of the upp r
room is re-enacted. I can di cern
James and John, and th old on
must be Peter. Which i Juda ? Lat r,
the outer garment of Chr£stos are
removed ; he i now loth d only in a
simple white gown. nd th n with
dramatic under tat m nt h kn 1
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William Butler Yeats wrote "Drama only flourishes in the neighborhood of its shrine."
In those words is entangled the rich and complex relationship of drama and religion.
before each of the others, towel in
hand, and washes each man's feet
from a basin. He embraces and
kisses each one as he goes on to the
next. The mass of people is absolutely quiet during this ritual of cleansing. Only the click of dozens of cameras intrudes. Is one a full participant in, or only a voyeur of, a ritual,
if it is mostly experienced through
the lens of a Pentax?
It is dark, after 9 p.m. on Friday,
as I join the torchlight procession
moving through the streets of Scala.
I can see the shields, the lamps, and
a large wooden cross at the front.
But the crowd is so huge that not
until much later do I catch a glimpse
of the main object: an open wooden
bier, intricately carved and festooned
with flowers, with an icon of Christ
within it. A sprinkle of holy water
lands on me. The woman in the second story window looks solemnly
back at me in the torchlight. The
procession stops at each of three
ships in port as the crew and passengers are given the sacrament.
Then back to the churchyard where
the strong young men who have carried the bier lift it high, and all of
us pass under it into the church. Another ritual, we have pa sed under
the death of Christ.

V
The six kilometers to the rural
village of Kampos in the late twilight of Saturday evening seem
short. I am much too early; I slowly
sip two small cups of Greek coffee in
the only eating place in the illage.
As I enter the churchyard just before 11 p.m., the worshiper gaze in
curiosity. Not many travelers venture outside the port of cala and the
mona tery village of Chora. It is
impossible to be inconspicuous in
Greece with blonde hair and blue
eyes.
But once inside, I am ignored.
Tonight, the candle I buy i large,
almost two feet long. The ervice
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proceeds: we chant Kyn·e Eleison,
and here I join in. We stand all the
time; only a few wooden benches
around the edges of the room are
used by the very elderly.
At ten of twelve, the priest lights
his candle, and in turn, each worshiper lights his from his neighbor.
The priest, followed by the Scriptures carried by two boys, leads us
all out to the square. The Word is
read, and exactly at midnight, all
joy breaks loose. The three church
bells ring; we all raise our candles
high into the air, not in a gentle
Christmas-Eve-way, but as in an
enthusiastic high school pep rally.
We shout each time we raise the
candles: Christos nesti! Christos nesti!
Christos nesti! Three times, and louder each time to declare that Christ is
indeed risen, no doubt about it.
Young boys explode firecrackers
and fireworks for ten minutes. How
better for a twentieth century believer to symbolize that the tomb
burst open? The whole event is
Fourth of July and Christmas and
my be t birthday party all rolled
into one!
Mo t of us follow the priest back
into the church. But some of the
young boys do not. As the service
continue , firecrackers can still be
heard now and then. When a particularly loud one explodes, the old
women eated in back shake their
head and cros themselves.
Much, much later, about 3:30, the
sacrament climaxes the wor hip. I
avor the sweet honey ta te of the
bread on m walk back · a bit of the
large chunk is till left as light begin to appear gradually in the east.

VI
"Drama only flourishe in the
neighborhood of it shrine,' wrote
William Butler Yeats early in this
century, and in tho e words, the rich
and complex relation hip of drama
and religion i both uggested and
till further entangled. The paces

in which drama is enacted, commented Yeats, are indicative of the
deities which are there worshiped.
The place of action becomes a mirror, a microcosm, which both reflects and illumines our understanding of ourselves and our world. That
which takes place on stage are reenactments of fundamental and
characteristic rituals. Rituals, in
their broadest sense, says Northrop
Frye, are "recurrent acts of symbolic
communication."
In its incantation of word and its
use of appropriate mime, as well as
in the vestigal celebration of a sacrifice and a feast, the formal dimensions of ritual can be observed. The
ceremonial patterning of a drama
through its dialogue, incident, and
even the physical movements of the
characters on stage indicates the
ritualistic nature of its form. The
deaths of Eliot's Becket in Murder
in the Cathedral, of Shakespeare's
Desdemona in Othello, and of
O 'Neill's Brown in The Great God
Brown are all carefully patterned for
ritualistic action.
But the participants in drama,
both the actors and the audience, are
joined together not only by particular words and actions, but they also
form for a few hours a community
who enters a unified suspension of
disbelief. They have all consented
to believe in the world created on
stage. Drama requires, for its maximum fulfilment, a high degree of
social cohesion, a common understanding of values, symbols, and
myths. Above all other arts, drama
is the art of shared response. "In
drama," wrote the late Harold Clurman, "the community is talking with
itself."
Greek drama was not merely a
poet's presentation of a story, but a
ceremony in honor of the god. The
priests in these ancient rites of The pis had special seats, like canons at
a cathedral. Sophocles and Aeschylu
and Euripides accepted without que tion the faith-evoking ritual which
The Cresset

-Drama forms the word
moving between beings.
celebrated each year the resurrection
of the wine-god and assured the audience of its spiritual rebirth.
Drama still conveys the fundamental mysteries of life and death
and life after death. In the tragic
rise and fall of Macbeth, Willy Loman, and the Elephant Man are reflected rituals of sacrifice. Comedies,
whether Shakespeare's mistaken
identity plays or current Broadway
musicals, are re-enactments of renewal in their rituals of celebration
and feast.
The chief function of theater,
wrote Gabriel Marcel, is "to awaken
or re-awaken in us the consciousness
of the infinite which is concealed in
the particular." The genius of theater is its ability to put people in
touch with the mysteries of the universe we inhabit. If the rituals are
diminutive and truncated, like the
inchoate rites in Waiting for Godot,
the resultant action portrays the
quest for meaning, the search for
order and harmony. We have always sensed the paradox - and the
frustration- of our finite existence
within an infinite universe. In ritual, we participate in a timeless
world permitting us to transcend, at
least for the moment, the temporal
limitations of our condition.
Liturgy is inherently dramatic;
drama is a re-enactment of our fundamental response to connect man
and man, man and nature, and even
man and God. In 1925, Martin Buber, in a little-known essay entitled
"Drama and Theatre," suggested
that drama is "the formation of the
word as something that moves between beings, the mystery of word
and answer. Essential to it is the fact
of the tension between word and answer."
A two week pilgrimage to the
land where Christianity and culture
have been in juxtaposition for al~ost 2,000 years reminded me that
m the tension between word and
answer, religion and drama both
till find their purpose for being. Cl
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(From the congregation: Palm Sunday)
These red balloons on frail strings
swaying with our corporate breath
create a canopy of supplication
a sea for walking on
when touching
skin to skin
in perfect unison.
Then one escapes.
Exploding red against the ky
it soars into the stratosphere
replacing stagnant air with
unfamiliar majesty
and we rejoice.
The symmetry' been marr d of our
but one so strong, o £re of tring
convinced the prayer' been h ard
believes the sea survive and leave
to gather other red balloon
create a cond an p .
Lois Reiner
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For the first time since the peak year of the Vietnam War
in 1968, military spending began to rise in 1980.

The Defense
Budget Billions
The Story Behind
The Headlines
Albert R. Trost
On September 8, 1980 President
Carter signed the 1981 weapons
procurement authorization bill. The
story was covered by the major television networks and big-city dailies,
but from the brief nature of most of
the reports one had the feeling the
story was carried more out of obligation than interest. After all, an authorization to expend $52.8 billion
at least deserves mention. Probably
the overwhelming majority of viewers and readers were satisfied with
this coverage. These budget authorizations come in the dozens, year-in
and year-out. The defense authorizations are often larger than other
categories in the federal budget, but
since "billions of dollars" is a concept far beyond the average citizen,
the figures numb rather than excite.
This is not to say that alertness
and interes~ on the part of the citizen
will be enough to catch the signifi-

Albert R. Trost is Associate Professor
of Political Science and Acting Chairman of the Department of Political
Science at Valparaiso University. Presently Professor Trost is teaching a course
on Comparative Defense Policies ( USAUSSR) at the University.
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cance of the report. To guµ.rantee
the confusion of all but the professionals and experts in the national
security field, Congress now considers the federal budget in whole or
in parts, three times a year. Before
the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, we were treated to
only two reviews of the budget, the
authorizatio~ stage and the appropriations stage. Now there must be a
prior review, admittedly in much
less detail. Of course, the three processes come up with totals that differ
by a few billions of dollars. The confusion does not end here, as these
totals are reported as both "constant"
and "current" dollars. We are also
given a choice of "total obligational
authority," "budget authority," or
"outlays." This is all to say that the
$52.8 billion figure for weapons procurement is available in eleven other
versions, all being official and final
in the sense of having been passed
into law.
This could be an argument for
totally ignoring the September 8,
1980 signing of the weapons procurement bill, but exactly the opposite response is required. The authorization of $52.8 billion for weapons procurement for the fiscal year
1981 has great significance as an indicator of our policy commitments
in the United States. This significance can be chiefly derived by putting the $52.8 billion figure in an
historical perspective and by relating it to other items in the federal
budget. What this comparative perspective will show is that the antimilitary attitudes and policy priorities of the Vietnam War period have
been turned around, if not forgotten.
There is now a pro-military, prodefense commitment of a longer
duration than election year, 1980.
The Vietnam War turned around
a downward-trend in American defense spending that dated from the
end of the Korean War. From 1965
defense spending rose to its Vietnam peak in 1968. The commitment

to defense in 1968 was still considerably less than the commitment in the
Korean War. The defense budget
represented 12.1 per cent of the
Gross National Product in 1953,
compared to 9.3 per cent in 1968.
Defense spending amounted to 57
per cent of the federal government
budget in 1953, but was only 43.3
per cent in 1968. Disillusionment
and reaction to our involvement in
Vietnam were so strong that defense
spending fell faster after 1969 than
it had after the end of the Korean
War. By Fiscal Year 1976, the defense budget reached a level lower
than any year since 1953, expressed
as a percentage of the Gross National
Product (5.4), or as a percentage of
the whole federal budget (24), or in
constant 1981 dollars.
Though Presidents Nixon and
Ford proposed lowered commitments to defense, Congress pressed
for even more cuts. Congress cut
more than 5 per cent from the defense budgets proposed by the President in Fiscal Years 1970, 1972,
1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976. These
cuts are above-average. Congress
pressed on a broader front than the
budget in these years. It was in 1974
that Congress passed the War Powers
Act over President Nixon's veto.
This law requires the President to
seek Congressional authorization or
a declaration of war for the commitment of American forces overseas
for a period longer than 60 days.
This could be a major qualification
of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief. Also in the 19701976 period Congress required more
information on intelligence activities, executive agreements made by
the President, and arms sales to
other nations, including the new
power to block arms sales.
With the election of President
Carter in 1976, the commitment to
defense seemed destined to go even
lower. Carter-reflecting the mood
of the post-Vietnam years, especially
in the Democratic Party- had camThe Cresset

The larger commitment of tax dollars to weaponry is now acceptable to the majority
of Americans, and this commitment seems of longer duration than election year 1980.
paigned on a platform that pledged
defense cuts of $5 to 7 billion a
year. There was also a pledge to
cut arms sales drastically. However,
Fiscal Years 1976 and 1977 turned
out to be the bottom for military
spending. There was a slight increase, in real terms, in Fiscal Year
1978. The budget for Fiscal Year
1979, the first that ~as totally prepared by the Carter administration,
showed another small increase in
real terms for defense. For the first
time since the peak of the Vietnam
War, defense spending as a share of
the GNP and the federal budget
started to rise in 1980.
The change was not only evident
in President Carter's attitude toward defense. There was a clear
change in the response of the Congress. After cutting the defense figure proposed by President Ford in
1976 by over 7 per cent, they cut only
2.6 per cent in 1977, 2.3 per cent in
1978, 1.7 per cent in 1979, and 1.1
per cent for Fiscal Year 1980. In fact,
by the final resolution of the 1980
budget it almost seemed that Congress was leading a reluctant President Carter in the direction of a
greater commitment toward defense. Although Congress did cut
the President's request by a small
amount for Fiscal Year 1980, it was
unusually active in making substantial changes in how the money
was allocated within the defense
budget. Congress actually increased
the amount that the President requested for categories that are usually grouped under the heading, "Investment" (weapons research, development, and procurement), while
making large cuts under the more
mundane heading of "Operation
and Maintenance."
President Carter's signing of the
$52.8 billion weapons procurement
authorization derives its significance
from its strong reinforcement of
these trends. First of all, though it
represents only a third of the amount
that will finally be authorized for
December, 1980

defense in Fiscal Year 1981, it continues the upward trend in defense
spending. The 52.8 billion figure
represents an increase of $ll.4 billion over the 1980 amount, up over
21 per cent! A second trend that is
clearly continued is the desire of
Congress to move more quickly than
the President toward an increased
commitment to defense. The President's proposal for spending on
weapons was itself $5.5 billion higher than the Fiscal Year 1980 authorization. However, Congress added
another $5.9 billion to the already
increased request! As was mentioned
above, Congress had added a billion
dollars to the weapons request in
1980, balancing this out in the total
defense budget by cutting other categories, especially ordinary operation and maintenance of the armed
forces . It will not be possible to
make up the $5.9 billion in this way.
An overall increase is certain.
A third and closely related trend
is the tendency of Congress to emphasize the "Investment" categories
in its pushing of defense. Weapons
procurement is the largest item in
"Investment" along with research
and development and military construction. All of these items were
substantially raised, but the weapons
procurement category is so large in
relation to the others that the commitment here is determining. Congress is especially fascinated with
ships and planes as an investment.
President Carter asked for money
to buy one new nuclear attack submarine, Congress decided two would
be better, adding $600 million. The
President asked for four guided missile frigates, Congress gave him ix
costing $500 million more. The
President wanted 30 F-15 fighter ,
Congress responded with 42, adding
170 million more. The Pre ident
got 12 A-6 fighter-bombers though
he had not asked for any. Congre
generously provided 60 F-18 instead of the 48 reque ted and 30
F-14s instead of 24.

The $52.8 billion weapons procurement authorization was not the
only evidence of a more supportive
attitude toward defense in 1980. Although presidential candidate John
Anderson challenged ome of the
priorities within the defense budget,
none of the major presidential candidates really challenged the size of
the overall commitment. 1980 was
also the year in which Congress
funded a draft registration system,
though by a close margin in the
Senate. Not only was the regi tration
system funded, it was al o carried
out in a general atmosphere of
grudging co-operation. Seven years
after the trauma of Vietnam and the
draft, this marked a fairly substantial change in attitudes.
The major reason for the prodefense shift in public and Congressional attitudes from the Vietnam
backlash period of the early 1970 ,
is that Americans are feeling in ecure in today's world. The rea on
for the insecurity are not difficult
to see or understand: the drawn-out
hostage situation in Iran and wid spread attacks on our r pr ntatives abroad, increa ed threat to the
peace and our oil supply in the Middle East, and reliabl and ub tantial information that th Ru ian
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commitment to national security.
One can have no quarrel with that
reasoning. From there it is assumed
that the most direct way to increase
our national security is to strengthen
the armed forces. It seems that the
most direct way to strengthen the
armed forces is to increase their
numbers and to buy them bigger
and more sophisticated weapons.
That these same weapons, as they
are developed, manufactured and
sold, provide jobs for people who
are constituents of Congressmen
makes this path to national security
even more persuasive.
If the final votes on the 1981 weapons procurement authorization in
the Senate (78 to 2) and in the House
(360-49) are any indication, there is
not much questioning of the connection among national security, weapons and jobs for workers.1 Why
should the mass media raise any
more questions, or give any more
attention to the September 8 event?
We are simply buying our national
security. The picture of the President affixing his signature to the
Act of Congress- even the whole
complicated process of Congress's
consideration of the procurement
bill-is very important (as all public
political events are) as a symbol.
Here is a symbol of the acquisition
of national security. The symbol is
reassuring in a threatening world.
These same annual events would
have been reassuring in the period
up to 1968 as we tried to meet the
unorthodox challenge to American
power by the North Vietnamese and
the Viet Cong.
"Weapons Budget Up $11.4 Billion," and "$52.8 Billion for Weapons," read the headlines for stories
on September 8, 1980. It is good to
be reassurE:;d; that is why the upward
trend in defense spending will continue for a while. The reality behind
the symbolic event would have
made a much longer, a much more
complicated, and a very much more
disturbing story that day in September.
Cl
1 To be fair . Senator George McGovern ques-

tioned such connections in an article in the
October, 1980 Harper's(pp . 33-40).
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Contemporary morality substantiates the old cliche, "If you are not
confused, it only shows that you are
not well informed." Not only direct
engagement in personal and social
issues, but also the rigorous pursuit
of the discipline of ethics often appear to achieve clarity only through
superficial oversimplification. Both
the works of James Gustafson here
reviewed aim at delineating the issues and problems with which we
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under James M Gustafson at the Yale
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Christian faith is not
needed to be moral.
must cope, if some measure of substantial clarity is to emerge.
Two questions come to the fore in
everyday moral experience and in
technical ethical discussion. One is
whether there are any good reasons
for being moral. If uncontrollable
forces determine what we do, our
feelings notwithstanding, or if life
consists in a simple succession of
disconnected episodes, the moral
quest seems drained of all reality.
And, if we do attain the conviction
that the moral quest makes sense,
how do we find the motive power to
act and the conviction that our actions have some credible sense of
being pertinent? Gustafson addresses both of these questions from the
informing perspective of the Christian faith, but in a continuing dialogue with Christian and non-Christian moralists of various persuasions.
James Gustafson, the successor of
H. Richard Niebuhr at Yale University, is now a University Professor at
the University of Chicago Divinity
School. Clearly, he belongs to the
first rank of those seriously engaged
in moral inquiry. His volume Christ
and the Moral Life, which outlined the
five historical approaches to Christian ethics, has established itself as
a landmark work. Beginning with
his early work Treasure in Earthen
Vessels, he has applied the insights
of sociology, especially the sociology
of knowledge, to the life of the Christian community. (He expresses his
posture and method with respect to
the latter discipline in the final footnote in the volume on Protestant
and Roman Catholic ethics.) And
many of the most productive and
creative scholars in dhics, both
Protestant and Roman Catholic,
have pursued their doctoral studies
under his guidance.
In pursuing the question Can
ethics be Christian? Gustafson begins with the everyday experience of
people. This contrasts with an approach that starts with the foremost
moral issues under discussion The Cresset

Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin held that universal human ethics and Christian ethics
are convertible terms: all morality which is rationally justifiable is Christian.
abortion, war and violence, population control, or the highly technical
questions raised by medical and biological research. The continuing
reference point of his discussion is
a biographical incident that occurred
during a moment of relaxation in a
Lexington Avenue bar in New York
City after a professional conference.
A highly respected colleague, a
lapsed Southern Baptist who no
longer professed any religious conviction, intervened when the bartender shortchanged one of his
drunken customers. The colleague
proceeded further to deposit the
drunk in a cab and, after taking precautions that the cab driver would
not rip off his sodden passenger,
sent him home. Gustafson sets about
analyzing how Christian faith could
influence a person to perform this
model action in similar circumstances.
Gustafson considers first the determining factors which shape our
behavior, and analyzes them in
terms of the physical makeup of an
individual, the psychological factors, particularly how the unconscious shapes our decisions and actions, and the social and cultural
influences on the moral life. Acknowledging that to deal with these
issues adequately would require a
volume in itself, Gustafson sets out
his reasons for concluding that a
person possesses the capacity to be a
moral agent in some degree, that is
to be in some measure self-determining within the conditions that
shape his life. Moral agency refers
to the capacity, or bundle of capacities, which enable a person to provide direction and to control his
powers in such a way that what she
does is her own doing. He then turns
his attention to the question of in
what ways the religious life and religious beliefs qualify the conditions
which make for consistency in human action.
Three terms · provide the framework for Gustafson's analysis of the
December, 1980

aspects of the self which shape the
moral life. Gustafson defined these
terms in detail in his work on Christ
and the moral life and has employed
them consistently in his work. An
individual holds certain beliefs, convictions which he can articulate and
which enter the thought processes
in deciding upon a course of action.
Second, an individual can be understood in terms of basic dispositions,
the readiness to act in a certain manner, often discussed in terms of
habits or moral virtues. Our knowledge of a person's dispositions
makes it possible to predict how he
will act under given conditions.
Third, an individual follows certain
intentions, dominant purposes and
goals which give direction to action.
Significantly, Gustafson focuses
first on the nature and development
of believing in the life of the Christian, not on Christian beliefs. This
stems from the insight that morally
significant dimensions are present
in the actions of people even when
there is no explicit moral intention.
Their actions express fundamental
attitudes, or dispositions, and basic
intentions which may not be consciously articulated. They have become a part of the person one is.
Gustafson chooses to examine brief1y how love becomes a fundamental
disposition and dominant intention
in the believer's life through the
continuing interaction between the
believer's religious experience and
her experiences in interaction with
family and other people. This is
done with the explicit recognition
that love is only one of the basic elements, or themes, in the life of faith.
The disposition and intention of
love emerges in the interrelationship between the experience of
being loved and forgiven by others
and the experience of the love of
God.
The readiness to love i not imply the result of momentary re ponses to being loved, but emerge in
living out of the reality of love. The

believer's articulated beliefs are an
inference from the experience of the
reality of the love of God. There is
no simple, immediate relationship
between believing in the reality of
God and human moral activity, since
experiencing the reality of God occurs in and through the individual
and social aspect of 11.fe. Th r ults
depend upon how decisive th xperience of God has become for a
person, and the degree of con ci ntiousness that a person exerci
in
developing his capacities for elfdete1mination in the light of r ligious beliefs and experienc .
Building on this experiential matrix, Gustafson methodically analyze
how faith influences the basic el ments of the moral life. The e are
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Neither the symbols nor the concepts which relate an understanding of God are fixed.
The experience of God is continually reconceptualized and expressed in new symbols.
the reality of God evokes, sustains,
and renews certain sensibilities,
which in turn evoke moral seriousness and provide reasons for the
moral life. These sensibilities express themselves in certain attitudes
which may be correlated with a variety of concepts and pictures employed to portray God. A sense of
dependence, rooted in the notion of
God as creator, produces an awareness of personal and group limits; a
sense of repentance, which stems
from the notion of God as authority
and judge, produces critical selfawareness. The sense of gratitude,
which Gustafson considers the heart
of religious morality in the West,
corresponds to the beneficence of
God and empowers people to act.
The sense of possibility stemming
from understanding God as one who
continues to act creative! y and reJemptively creates an awareness of
opportunity, and the sense of direction rooted in God as the ultimate
end of all things provides a path
through the thicket of complexity.
All this adds up to a life lived in imitation of God, not in fanatic selfassertion or a simple mirroring of
divine virtues, but by living response
to the source of power and life experienced in all human interactions.
In his consideration of how religious symbols and concepts function to interpret the significance of
persons, events, and circumstances,
Gustafson examines how Christians
have employed them to understand
social movements such as civil rights
or periods of social turmoil. Religious symbols provide Christians a
key by which to determine the values
at stake and to define the fitting attitudes, moral principles, and norms
of action. Because Christians regard
their symbols as having universal
significance, the problem of their
authority requires consideration.
Gustafson foreswears a detailed discussion of this matter, but notes that
the claim requires that Christians
render an account of their interpre26

tations which is intelligible to people
outside the religious circle. He notes
further tha.t the symbols have a
double reference. They refer to the
significance of events and circumstances in light of the experience of
God, and they refer to the experience of the ultimate power in the
light of events and circumstances.
This implies that neither the symbols nor the concepts which relate
an understanding of God are fixed;
the experience of God is being continually reconceptualized and expressed in new symbols.
What are the criteria by which
symbols or concepts are judged as
appropriate to a situation? Gustafson rejects the attempt to measure
validity by the effective force symbols have of persuading people as
simply dishonest. The uncritical
attempt to find symbols which justify
moral opinions already held, found
in many contemporary affirmations
of liberation movements, may be
honest but lacks rigor. Others have
found the validation in the concise
formulations of systematic theology.
For Gustafson, such formulations, as
developed in current theologies of
hope or process theology, provide
clarity by oversimplifying the richness and complexity of the experience of God. Any adequate use of
symbols and concepts to interpret
circumstances has to take into account the multi-dimensional nature
of the experience of God and of the
priority of grace. Gustafson regrets
the looseness of his proposed norms
and admits that it may be easier to
find out what is right than to find
out how Christians go about deciding what is right. But if the religious
community experiences the reality
of God, then moral reflection has to
take place in the context of this experience.
Finally, Gustafson turns to the
question of how faith shapes the conduct of persons through rationally
relating beliefs to moral principles
and moral values which guide ac-

tion. The works of historical figures
such as Luther and Calvin and of
contemporary theologians such as
H. Richard Niebuhr and Karl Barth
are analyzed to demonstrate how
Christians have sought to find guidelines for action in what God is enabling them to do and in generalizations formulated from human experience. For Christians, the central
symbol of faith is Jesus Christ, and
this implies the attempt to infer rationally principles and values that
direct a life grounded in him. The
moral teachings of Jesus, his parables, and the narratives of his deeds
provide the sources. The principles
and values derived from these sources are converted "in large measure"
into the terms of natural or rational
ethics. But, for Gustafson, the "in
large measure" implies a remainder
that cannot be converted into such
terms. To exemplify this remainder,
he chooses the example of the principled Christian pacifist. The cogency of his argument is weakened,
however, by the fact that it is unclear
whether Gustafson himself holds a
pacifist position.

To be Christian or
religious simply to
be moral misses the
heart of religion.
In his conclusion, Gustafson returns again to the question of the
book: Can ethics be Christian? The
answer depends in part upon our
definition of ethics. Two traditional
answers to this question have answered in terms of a definition
which holds that a valid ethic must
be one on which all rational persons
can agree. Thomas Aquinas, Luther,
and Calvin held that universal human ethics and Christian ethics are
convertible terms. There is no distinctive Christian morality, because
all morality which is rationally justifiable is Christian. The followers of
the radical Reformation held that
the ethics of Christians must be ChrisThe Cresset

The religious experience is not a separate experience in life, but one that occurs
in other experiences. The experience of God is never the experience of God alone.
tian, because the Christian community has a vocation to follow
Jesus. Whether or not this corresponds to the ethics and morality of
non-Christians is regarded as immaterial. Gustafson's answer is more
restrained then either of these responses. He concludes simply that
religion qualifies morality, and that
ethics can be Christian in the senses
that a) the morphology of religious
morality can be explicated, and b)
that certain action-guiding values
and principles can be inferred as
normative for action by those who
share a common Christian experience of the reality of God.
For the serious Christian (and
likewise the devout Jew and Moslem), every moral act is also a religiously significant act. To act for the
sake of justice is not only a moral act,
but a moral act done for religious
as well as moral reasons. In addition,
morality and ethics can be considered Christian because of the character of the moral agents. In Christian experience, it is not possible to
separate the religious characteristics
from the moral characteristics of
persons. To experience God results
in the readiness to act in certain
ways and to affirm certain dispositions, affections, and intentions. A
Christian ethic can give an intelligible account of these qualifications
and define imperatives directed
toward the sort of persons Christians
ought to be. Finally, it makes sense
to speak of morality and ethics as
Christian in that distinctive points
of reference are used to guide moral
action. These provide symbols and
concepts to interpret the moral and
religious significance of events and
circumstances.
Since this approach assumes that
morality can be grounded without
appeal to religious experience, the
question may be asked why then be
religious or Christian? Such a question, contends Gustafson, misses the
point of the book. To be Christian
or religious simply to be moral, just
December, 1980

as being religious in order to be
happy, misses the heart of religion.
This lies in the experience of the
reality of God, mediated through
all sorts of experiences. The Christian experiences this reality with
compelling clarity in Jesus and the
Christian story. Christian ethics is
the intellectual discipline which
renders an account of the experience
and draws from it normative inferences for the conduct of the Christian community and its members.
Repeatedly in this volume, as
noted earlier, Gustafson returns to
the figure of his friend in the Lexington Avenue bar. He notes that
his friend would have found much
of the analysis and reflection in this
book alien to his more direct mode
of life. It is unclear, however,
whether the anticipated reaction by
his friend would stem from his antipathy to intellectual reflection or
from his disinterest in the religious
life and the theological enterprise.
Whatever the answer, the implied
question points to a primary insight
of Gustafson. The religious experience is not a particular and separate experience in life, but one that
occurs in and through all other experiences. Thus, for Gustafson, the
experience of God is never the experience of God alone. This engenders the believer's continuing
quest to act consistently according
to the manner in which God is acting upon him. Christian ethics is
neither a matter of imposing the
norms of one experience upon all
other experiences, or of asserting the
norms others hold with a greater degree of urgency. The experience of
the reality of God introduces a continuing effort to be more elf-critical
and to be open to the opportunities
in a situation. This effort may complicate the moral life, but for the
person who has experienced thi
reality, it is an unavoidable task.
In the volume Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, Gustaf on undertakes analyzing how Chri tian have

set about performing this task. His
goal is neither a historical study or
an outline of typical approaches and
methods, although the book contains both. Rather, the study is borne
by a conviction that both these fundamental strains of Western Christianity have come to a common appreciation of the basic elements in
the Christian faith and tradition.
Their common concern now is for
the intellectual cogency of Christian
theological ethics, the quality of the
intellectual life of the Chri tian
community and its mission in these
crucial decades. Gustafson writes
from the conviction that nothing can
substitute for intellectual hone ty
and the best achievable cogency in
thought about Christian faith and
morality. This concern determine
the chaste style in which the book i
written, depending upon the importance of the subject matter rather
than flamboyance of style to maintain the interest of the reader. A
studied effort is made to p netrate
technical jargon and traditional t reotypes to unrover suhstantiv i u .
Gustafson begins with a bri f urvey of the historical diver n b tween the two tradition in th olo ical ethics. In tead of b ginnin with
fun9alI).ental th logical cliff r nces, however, he delineat th quit
different function th logical thi
has played in ach. In th
ath li
tradition, moral th lo d
lop d
in relation to th ffi
f p nan .
The confe r d p nd d p n car
fully worked out guid lin to valuate offens and o pro id guidance. Pr t tant th u ht ha la k d
the ame pr ur to
om p ifi
in givin m ral guidanc . In ad ition, moral th ol
in th
ath li
tradition ha
um d a hi h r I 1
of in tituti nal authorit
hur h.
u taf
n
la , and th pla
u
on th
ture. Th
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Radical Catholics seem to get along with their radical Protestant counterparts,
and conservative Catholics and Protestants have nothing to do with one another.
of sin was not simply one of emphasis or doctrinal nicety, but that of
quite different paradigms of the religious life. Catholicism preserved
the neo-Platonic image articulated
by Augustine, which understands
human nature in terms of divinely
given ends. As a result, the moral
quality of the individual's life bore
direct religious meaning as the measure of the achievement of the divine purpose. Luther pictured the
religious life in the relational terms
of grace and trust. Here the norms
of action in the moral life no longer
had the same immediate religious
significance. The life of faith could
be expressed in a variety of forms.
Gustafson does not develop explicitly the significance of this paradigm
shift as he draws out the other historical theological divergences.
The differences between the traditions on the law were not primarily
ethical, but theological and religious. Catholicism followed the natural law in defining the true end of
human life and the action which
corresponds to it, while Luther
viewed the law primarily in its function of diagnosing lack of trust in
God, and only secondarily that of
ordering life. With respect to the use
of Scripture, Protestants have consistently made it a primary source of
moral teaching, despite the great
variety in their positions. In the
Catholic tradition, the natural law
tradition produced moral teaching
derived independently of the biblical sources, and Scripture was often
used to proof text the natural law
conclusions.
When he turns to a study of contemporary theological ethics, Gustafson first analyzes how each tradition deals with practical moral teaching, next their different philosophical approaches, and only then their
differing theological bases. Neither
contemporary Protestantism or Roman Catholicism presents a solid
front. Gustafson notes that radical
Catholics seem to get along well with
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their radical Protestant counterparts, while moderate Catholics are
at home with moderate Protestants,
and that most conservative Catholic
and Protestant theologians have
nothing to do with one another.
Gustafson focuses on the middle
range of writers and sticks closely to
a direct exposition of their writings.
He propounds the thesis that traditional Roman Catholic moral theology brings to the contemporary
scene the strengths of an ordered
pattern of ethical thought based on
clear philosophical and theological
principles of positive moral substance, but with the liabilities of
being rigid and closed, and in great
difficulty when complex developments raise questions to traditional
formulations. Protestants bring an
openness which is responsive to
modernity, but tend to be excessively open-ended both in method and
substance.
In practical moral reasoning,
Protestants have tended to rely on
deciding what is morally good in
terms of the consequences of an action or on the moral intuition of the
moral agent. Too often, they have
overlooked the fact that most people
are neither moral geniuses nor moral
virtuosos. Roman Catholic moral
theology proves a good conversation
partner providing the substantive
guidance needed for moral choices.
In the discussion of situation ethics,
which Catholic thinkers undertook
long before its popularity in Protestant thought, moral theology shifted
from moral reasoning by deduction
from human nature to inductive
thought rooted in science and experience. Convergence with Protestant
thinkers emerged in a new historical consciousness open to new knowledge and new conditions, a personalist emphasis which does not think
of people simply in terms of a common human nature, a sense for the
larger context in which particular
actions have to be weighed, and a
view of the church which places

greater emphasis on the exercise of
individual conscience.
Both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians have taken up anew
the question of what philosophical
foundations are necessary and suf- ·
ficient for theological ethics to do
justice to the particularity of the
Christian tradition and to the common humanity and rationality Christians share with all people. Protestants have sought to cope with the
problems of historicism and existentialism from a predominantly
Kantian background. Again a convergence emerges as Catholic theologians have endeavored to revise
the natural law tradition with contemporary empirical and philosophical insights. The attempt to
relate human nature to the radical
freedom of the individual has been
central to this effort. Employing in
particular the insights of phenomenology, leading theologians have
come to the conclusion that the natural law is never finished. Although
traditional terms such as nature, law,
rights and justice are preserved,
either the referents of the terms have
been radically altered or given a
radically different content. Even if
both traditions in their recently received forms are insufficient, the
prospects for ecumenical ethics are
more promising than at any time
since the Reformation.
When he finally turns to the theological bases of ethics, Gustafson
recognizes that the historical differences are more crucial and more
problematic. It is essential to note
the different relations of theology to
ethics in both traditions. Roman
Catholic moral theology tended to
become an almost independent discipline without continuous relation
to fundamental dogmatic theology
and biblical studies. In Protestantism, ethical reflection and moral
teaching have traditionally been an
organic part of both systematic theological work and biblical studies.
Christian ethics emerged as a dis-
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Protestants tend to decide what is morally good on the moral intuition of the agent.
They overlook the fact that most people are neither moral geniuses or moral virtuosos.
tinct discipline only in the nineteenth century. Gustafson outlines
the studied effort of the Catholic
Josef Fuchs to develop a biblical
ground for natural law not only in
the biblical hints toward this tradition but also in christology. And
Bernard Haring, the most prolific
contemporary Catholic moral theologian, has articulated a clear New
Testament basis for morality which
is open, dynamic and personal.

Christ is present not
only in faith but in
culture qua culture
and in man qua man.
The question of the relation of
nature and grace proves more complex. This language, which is more
appropriate to Catholic theology,
has its parallels in the Lutheran distinction of law and gospel and in the
contemporary categories of Christ
and culture originated by H. Richard Niebuhr. Trends toward giving
the priority to grace appear in both
Catholic and Protestant thought. In
the massive work of the German
Catholic Karl Rabner, the order of
creation is grounded in grace, just
as the order of redemption. Christ is
considered to be present not only in
human actions of explicit faith, but
also in culture qua culture and in
humans qua human. Similar emphases are found in the work of Joseph
Sittler, an American out of the Lutheran tradition, and of Karl Barth,
a Swiss of Calvinist heritage. While
not overlooking the decisive differences between these thinkers, Gustafson discerns a movement in all
toward a theological ethics which
becomes more universal rather than
Particularistic, open rather than
closed, and dynamic rather than
static.
In the sphere of ecclesiology,
Protestantism verges on chaos. In
practice, the lack of any clear conensus makes the informed individDecember, 1980

ual conscience the final authority
on moral questions. The teaching of
theologians has to win the consent
of the minds and hearts of mature
Christians. This focus on the individual's informed conscience is not
alien to the Catholic tradition. What
was always implicitly present, has
become public knowledge in the
reaction to the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae, which dealt with contraception. The church does not
claim infallibility for its moral teachings, only that they are authentically
Christian and, as such, to be taken
seriously. The rhetoric of the "people of God" and the "pilgrim church"
symbolizes an altered perception
with implications for the authority
of moral teachings as well as for the
process by which they are formed.
Despite his conviction of emerging convergence between the Catholic and Protestant traditions in
ethics, Gustafson does not write in a
spirit of ecumenical utopianism.
Nor does he attempt to find a least
common denominator to which both
traditions can give allegiance. His
goal is movement toward a more
comprehensive and coherent account of Christian ethics which has
been tested in its parts and as a whole
for its validity. As long as moralists
claim to represent the Christian tradition, these more systematic questions must be pressed. In his conclusion, Gust~fson outlines theses which
define the terms and scope of this
task.
An adequate theological ethic
must be comprehensive and coherent. To achieve this, it must relate
four base points: a) an understanding and interpretation of God, b) an
interpretation of the meaning of
human experience, c) an interpr tation of persons as moral agents, and
d) an interpretation of how p ople
ought to make moral choic
and
judge their own action as w 11 as
those of other . The mo t coher nt
account of th ological ethi
in
terms of th e criteria i that of

Thomas Aquinas. In Prote tant theology, Karl Barth ha offered a
roughly coherent account of ethics.
In terms of adequacy and relevance, a theological ethie has to relate systematically four ources: a)
the Bible and the Chri tian tradition, b) philosophical methods and
principles, c) scientific information
and methods, and d) human xp rience broadly conceived. Which
source is finally decisive will det rmine much of the content of the ha e
points in a coherent theological
ethics.
Rapprochement between the traditions is easier to achieve with reference to more limited area than it
is to achieve between the basic organizing principles or p rceptions
around which the base points cohere. Agreement on specific i su ,
such as those in medical ethi , i
much easier to achieve than agr ment on the organizing metaphor
or principle which inform thical
thought. Fundamental conv r n
will occur only when th r i more
consensus on the b ic outl k or
metaphor which i appropriat to
Christian theological thi .
h
imperative to dev lop pr po al
toward this end ari
fr m th
mmon faith which i finally th human
unity of the Chri tian
In the

On Filling the Holes
In the Incarnation
Homileticus
A choir from above:

"We wish you a Merry Christmas,
We wish you a Merry Christmas,
We WISH you a Merry Christmas,
And a Happy New Year!
Glad Tidings to you . . ."
Pugh: Waiter! Can you turn down

that Muzak? We are trying to
talk at this table.
Homileticus: Why so crabby and
Scrooged, my friend?
P: I guess it's Christmas. All that
forced joy in the air depresses
me.
H: Be at peace, my friend. Let the
world have its calculated Christmas. Christians can keep the
gracious Christmas at Twelfth
Night or Epiphany. If need be,
every Christian holy day is a
moveable feast.
P: I suppose. Christian joy should
be able to cut through the world's
manufactured moods, even its
hyped hilarity.
H: But it doesn't for you ?
P: Not lately. I see so much misery
in life that God did not identify
with in Jesus Christ.
H: His life in the flesh with temptation, misunderstanding, betrayal, and injustice, and then suffering and death on a cross is not
enough misery for you?
P: But that all seems so distant, so
limited to Jesus of Nazareth, and
- well- so doctrinal.
30

H: You need a present vision, not
doctrines?
P: Possibly. There's so much in life
I do not see redeemed in Jesus.
He was never a lover, a husband,
a father. He was never middleaged, C?r elderly, or senile. He
never held down a dead-end job
year in and year out. He never
faced the draft or fought in war.
He never bore a long illness, like
cancer, or endured a mental or
physical handicap. He never carried the burden of civilization,
not even the burden of a single
institution of civilization. He
never even thanked those who
bore those burdens for him. In
fact, as far as I can see, he never
thanked anybody for anything
he or she did for him. He
never ...
H: Your list is endless?
P: Almost. There's a lot of man's
misery which God did not meet
concrete I y in Jesus of Nazareth.
H: To be sure. Incarnations are of
necessity limitations. But, I suppose we should not forget that
there are also many of man's
powers which God did notcould not- identify with in Jesus
of Nazareth. That list is almost
endless too.

P: Well , at ]east there seem to
be "holes" m the Incarnation.
What I do not see God live in
Jesus, I do not see redeemed.
H : Perhaps our Lord left those
"holes" for the saints to get "in"
on the Incarnation.
P: What?
H : Saint Paul even urges the saints
to "fill up" what is lacking in the
sufferings of Christ.' The Lord is
the "pioneer" and "trail blazer"
of the faith, but the saints are the
"settlers." That divine freedom
and human responsibility we see
in Jesus can be taken in faith into
the lives of lovers, husbands, and
fathers . Not to mention the lives
of lovers, wives, and mothers!
P: l see your point, but I don't see
such saints. At least few exemplary saints.

H: True, we are afflicted with Protestantism. And Protestants have
trivialized saintliness. I suppose
that when every believer is a
saint then no believer is a saint.
Yet there are exemplary saints
too.
P: Yes, Virginia, and there is also a
Santa Claus.
H: Perhaps. At least I would give
Saint Nicholas his due! The example of a weary old man giving
gifts without desire or hope of
anything in return should not be
ignored. He contrasts nicely
with that scoundrel, King Lear!
Meanwhile, there are all kinds of
real, exemplary saints fillt'ng the
"holes" you see in the Incarnation every day.
P: You speak metaphorically well.
H: No more nor less well than you
do when you speak of "holes" in
the Incarnation. Metaphors are
all we have when we speak of
God with us. But if, at Easter, we
can say that we are joined to
Christ in a resurrection like his,
then at Christmas I think we can
also say that we are joined to
Christ in an Incarnation like his.
P: That's a challenging thought, yet
very comforting.
H: Then it's probably sound theology.
P: You are saying that whenever
one lives out of divine freedom
and takes human responsibility
he is living out of the Incarnation
of God in Jesus Christ?
H: That will do for the doctrine.
You will have to discover the
vision for yourself. Each man
and woman finds his or her own
"hole" to fill with divine freedom and human responsibility.
P: Thanks. I feel less depressed.
Here, let me get your check.
Waiter!
H: No, thank you. I am not a clergyman. I'll pay my own check.
P: Then take mine too!
H : No. Also because I am not a
clergyman, I'll let you pay your
own check.
P: Merry Christmas!
H: Amen. Any day, and now.
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Advent 1980
John Strietelmeier
My sons tell me that one of their
happiest memories of Christmas
past is the custom we had of gathering around the tree on Christmas
morning to re-read Robert Benchley's delightful essay, "Editha's
Christmas Burglar."
All too briefly summarized, this
happy little story tells about Editha,
a darling child, who wakes on a
Christmas Eve upon hearing noises
downstairs and, concluding that it
must be a burglar, determined to go
downstairs and convert him. But the
burglar proves resistant to her innocent sweetness and ends up taking a
rope out of his bag and tying her up
good and tight, with a nice bright
bandana handkerchief around her
mouth, and trussing her up on the
chandelier. "Then, filling his bag
with the silverware and Daddy's imitation sherry, Editha's burglar tiptoed out by the door. As he left, he
turned and smiled. 'A Merry Christmas to all and to all a Good Night,'
he whispered and was gone."1
There was never any doubt where
the boys' sympathies lay. Childhood
may be any of a number of the sweet
things sentimentalists say it is, but
the one thing it is not is innocent.
The old, now unhappily abandoned
l

Robert Benchley , Inside Benchley ( ew
York : Harper and Brothers. 1942), pp.
136-137.
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Order of Holy Baptism had it right
when it instructed the minister to
inform the people that children are
conceived and born in sin and so are
under the wrath of God. The cheerful conclusion to those otherwise
forbidding words is that, however
one's life may unfold, it can't get a
whole lot worse than it began. For
parents, there is the equally happy
thought that any small progress they
may make toward civilizing and
Christianizing the child is to be accounted a major accomplishment
worthy to be set over against their
all too many manifest failures.
Anyway, justified by Baptismal
grace but not yet far advanced toward sanctification, our boys cheered
the burglar on and rejoiced at the
thought of Editha pendant from the
chandelier, "sore as a crab." It
seemed to them only right and proper that, in a universe governed by
justice, the little con arti t got her
comuppance while her intended
quarry tiptoed out with the silver
and the imitation sherry. For even
at their tender age, they had an instinct that a straightforward burglar
is better than a sanctimonious little
manipulator.
It is an instinct which needs to be
cultivated, especially as each happy
Christmas dawns on earth again. For
there is in the very air of a modern
sentimentalized, commercialized
Christmas the fetid odor of manipulation. Every heartstring gets tugged
by somebody, every surge of warm
sentiment gets enlisted in the service
of some cause, good, bad, or indifferent. We are tempted to buy more
than we can afford, or even want, to
assuage guilt-feelings that we can
not fully explain. We are invited to
revel in a nostalgia which b com
the subject of slick joke on the comedy shows of the day after Chri tma .
Pope Liberius, in 354, fixed D cember 25 as the date of Chri tma ,
apparently in the piou hop that
the celebration of the ativity would
provide Christians with a whol some alternative to the wild f ti al
of the Saturnalia, which was
1brated at the winter ol tic .
It hasn't turned out that , a .

nalia has triumphed-the chief difference being that our Christian
excesses are more commonly those
of the spirit than of the flesh. And
so the question becomes one of
whether we should not imply write
off the good Pope' noble experiment and follow the Puritans in eschewing the celebration of Chri tmas.
My tentative answer is o. I till
think that Chri tma may b
alvageable. But I am ure that it will
take some doing.
What the world will finally do
about Christma I do not know or
greatly care. But Christian p opl ,
I suspect, will 1 arn om day that
they can not mak anything mor
of Chri tmas than they mak of Advent. And what we pre ently mak
of Advent is very little. Advent i
chiefly the eason of x number of
shopping days until Christma . It i
a time of foot- or hopping, of baking and d corating and making li t .
For some, it i even a eason of irritation with the Church, for it i a
time when "liturgical nuts" in i ton
W edne day evening ervi
and
austere, undecorat d chan 1 and
penitential hymn that
ntra t
bleakly with the arol p urin f rth
from the downt wn P. . y t m .
t th
lik a
dy f r
a prop r Chri tma ? H w t inv t
the idea of Comin (whi h i what
Adv nt m an ) with h p and j y
and exp ctati n ?
I do not know. B
tha
the birth of thi

nd

ni

nti l
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